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Abstract 
 
Fishing vessels run on fossil fuels that produce greenhouse gases, which are harmful to the 
environment and costly to society. Since fuel use in fisheries is often subsidized through tax 
concessions, private fuel consumption will be higher than what is socially optimal. 
Furthermore, fuel tax concessions will lead to greater fishing effort, with overfishing as a 
possible consequence. 
 
This thesis deals with these negative externalities associated with fisheries. The aim of the 
study is to elicit the economic and environmental effects from removing fuel tax 
concessions, and to view these effects in relation to the results of current and optimal 
fisheries management. To this end, four different fuel cost scenarios are introduced as basis 
for the analysis. The current situation of the fishery is compared to an optimized fishery 
with fuel tax concessions maintained and removed, i.e. with fuel costs implemented. 
 
The target of the study is the commercial Baltic salmon fishery, which is a small-scale 
coastal fishery carried out with trapnets. The analysis employs a bioeconomic model, which 
accounts for the economic and biological features of this specific fishery.  
 
Results from the analysis conveyed that the fishery is currently unprofitable, and therefore 
not capable of coping with additional costs imposed on it. However, results from the 
optimization suggest that economic performance can be improved by managing the fishery 
in an optimal way, i.e. by adjusting the fishing effort to an efficient level. Furthermore, a 
movement to optimal management is suggested to be an efficient way of gaining both 
economic and environmental benefits. An optimally managed fishery is thus better equipped 
to pay for the external costs from the CO2 emissions arising from its fishing operations. 
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Kalastusalusten käyttämät fossiiliset polttoaineet tuottavat kasvihuonekaasuja, jotka ovat 
ympäristölle haitallisia ja aiheuttavat kustannuksia yhteiskunnalle. Polttoaineenkäyttöä 
tuetaan verovapautuksin, jonka seurauksena yksityinen kalastaja käyttää polttoainetta 
enemmän kuin mikä olisi optimaalista yhteiskunnan kannalta. Verovapautukset johtavat 
lisäksi kalastusponnistuksen kasvuun, mikä voi osaltaan aiheuttaa liikakalastusta. 
 
Tämä maisterintutkielma käsittelee näitä kalastukseen liittyviä ulkoisvaikutuksia. 
Tutkimuksen tavoite on selvittää verovapautusten poistosta aiheutuvat taloudelliset ja 
ympäristölliset seuraukset, sekä verrata näitä nykysäätelyn ja optimaalisen säätelyn alla 
olevaan kalastukseen. Analyysia varten tarkastelen neljää eri polttoainemaksuskenaariota. 
Nykykalastusta verrataan optimaaliseen kalastukseen tilanteessa, jossa verovapautukset ovat 
ennallaan sekä tilanteessa jossa vapautukset poistetaan, eli toisin sanoen implementoidaan 
polttoainemaksu. 
 
Tämän tutkimuksen tarkastelun kohteena on kaupallinen Itämeren lohenkalastus. Kyseessä 
on pienimuotoinen rannikkokalastus rysillä. Analyysissä käytetään bioekonomista mallia, 
joka huomioi tämän kalastuksen taloudelliset ja biologiset erityispiirteet. 
 
Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että nykyhetken kalastus on taloudellisesti kannattamatonta 
ja, että se tämän vuoksi ei pystyisi selviytymään polttoainemaksun tuomasta 
lisäkustannuksesta. Mallinnus toisaalta osoittaa, että optimaalisella säätelyllä, eli asettamalla 
kalastusponnistus tehokkaalle tasolle, voidaan parantaa kalastuksen taloudellista 
kannattavuutta. Optimaalinen säätely osoittautuu tehokkaaksi tavaksi saavuttaa sekä 
taloudellisia että ympäristöllisiä hyötyjä. Optimaalisesti säädellyllä kalastuksella olisi täten 
paremmat edellytykset maksaa kalastusoperaatioiden CO2 päästöistä aiheutuvat 
ulkoiskustannukset. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Fossil fuels are the primary energy input to fisheries around the world, therefore 
making nearly all current fisheries dependent on nonrenewable energy sources. In 
2000, global fisheries accounted for about 1.2% of the world’s oil consumption, which 
resulted in more than 130 million tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions  (Tyedmers, 
Watson & Pauly 2005, 635). Indeed, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO 2009, 88) has stated that fisheries and aquaculture make a small 
but still significant contribution to greenhouse gas emissions. Various attempts have 
been made to reduce global CO2 emissions, which is one of the key inducers of 
anthropogenic climate change (e.g. IPCC 2007, 3&19). 
 
Simultaneously fuel use in the fishing sector is often supported financially 
(subsidized) in different ways (Martini 2012, 7), causing fishing enterprises to use 
more fuel, with potentially harmful consequences to the environment (OECD 2006, 
108). In most OECD countries fisheries have access to tax-free fuel as a result of fuel 
tax concessions. The Group of Twenty (G20), which represents 90% of global GDP 
and 84% of global fossil fuel emissions, has made an appeal for worldwide focus on 
fossil fuel subsidies as an effort in the mitigation of climate change. The G20 Leaders 
have expressed a wish that inefficient fuel subsidies be phased out and rationalized 
over the medium term, since reducing support to fuel use can generate both 
environmental and economic benefits. Because fuel tax concessions are often less 
transparent than other support measures, they might easily be neglected when 
considering policy reforms (Martini 2012, 21). OECD (2011, 1) has stated, apart from 
that environmental taxes should be targeted to polluters or polluting behavior, that 
such taxes should preferably not have any exceptions. Further, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has been working for nearly a decade with getting subsidies that 
promote overfishing under control (Sumaila 2013, 251). 
 
Removing fuel tax concessions means in effect that the cost or harm to society from 
the use of fossil fuels is included into the price of fuel. The price of tax-free fuel does 
not contain the cost that befalls society from the use of fossil fuels, such as costs 
associated with climate change. The fuel cost to private enterprises is thus lower than 
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the cost to society, which will lead to fuel consumption that is higher than what is 
optimal from society’s point of view. There are two principal ways of addressing this 
problem, namely taxation and emissions trading. These are regulatory instruments that, 
if implemented correctly, will raise the private cost of fuel and therefore incentivize 
enterprises to reduce fuel consumption when making their production decisions. The 
assumption here is that both price controls (corrective taxes) and quantity controls 
(tradable permits) produce the same economically efficient outcome. However, current 
fisheries are not subject to such policies and little is known about the overall effects 
from their implementation. 
 
A step in the direction of obtaining such knowledge has been taken by e.g. the OECD 
Committee for Fisheries. In 2012 the OECD released a report that identified and 
measured fuel tax exemptions in the global fisheries sector. The report is a step toward 
an analysis of the impacts of fuel support and an initial assessment of the 
consequences of fuel subsidy removal in the fishing sector (Martini 2012, 5). Sumaila 
et al. (2006, 2008) have previously addressed the topic of fuel subsidies and their 
effects on fish resource sustainability on the global level. They claimed that the 
positive effects of recent fuel price increases, which should reduce effort, have been 
negated by the extensive fuel subsidies provided by national governments. The link 
between fuel price and economic performance of fisheries has been further studied by 
Cheilari et al. (2013). Results of this study showed that profitability declined in 
several EU fishing fleets during the study period in the 2000s, when fuel price 
increases occurred. Simultaneously, energy efficiency indicators have improved as a 
result of rising fuel costs. Ziegler & Hornborg (2014) also detected increased fuel 
efficiency in Swedish trawl fisheries, but concluded that better stock status was the 
primary explanation, not higher fuel costs. It was further suggested that fuel tax 
concessions maintain inefficient fisheries, since they favor fuel intensive fishing 
practices and large fleet capacity. 
 
However, not many empirical studies exist on the effects on fisheries and fishing 
operations from transforming fuel tax concessions policies (OECD 2006, 107; Martini 
2012, 20). Given that fuel is usually a significant part of fishing costs (e.g. Sumaila 
2008, 251), fuel support, or the lack of it, will have an impact on the cost of fishing, 
fishing effort and profitability. Such policy transformations means in effect the 
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implementation of some sort of fuel cost policies, for example fuel taxes. Further, 
Driscoll & Tyedmers (2010, 353&358) have pointed out that also fisheries policy has 
the potential to influence fuel use and fleet structure and, consequently, greenhouse 
gas emissions in fisheries. The nature and scope of the impacts from different 
management measures on the fishing industry, fuel use and emissions is an empirical 
question.  
 
1.1 Abolishing fuel tax concessions in Nordic fisheries 
 
This thesis takes these aforementioned topical issues into a Nordic and Finnish 
context. The thesis is part of a Nordic research project titled “The Impact of 
Abolishing Fuel Tax Concessions in Nordic Fisheries”. The project is funded by the 
Nordic Council and includes case studies from all Nordic countries, ranging from 
large-scale offshore trawling to small-scale coastal fisheries using passive gear. The 
aim of the project is to elicit the effects of removed fuel tax concessions on the fishing 
industry and on CO2 emissions, and to view these effects in relation to current and 
optimal management of the studied fisheries. 
 
The Finnish case studies the commercial Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) fishery in the 
northern Baltic Sea in the Gulf of Bothnia. This is a small-scale coastal fishery carried 
out with passive gear called trapnets. Since management of salmon should be based on 
the assessment of individual river stocks (ICES 2013a, 1), the specific target of this 
study is the River Tornionjoki (Torne River) wild salmon stock. River Tornionjoki 
produces one third of the wild salmon in the Baltic Sea, which translates to a salmon 
catch of several hundreds of thousands kilograms per year to the fishermen in the 
Baltic Sea region (FGFRI 2013a). Although the salmon fishery is not the most 
significant in terms of e.g. landing weight or value, it is an important target species for 
the coastal fisheries (FGFRI 2011a, 6). It is also one of the most controversial 
fisheries in the region, primarily because most Baltic salmon stocks are endangered 
(Kulmala et al. 2008a, 3; FGFRI 2013b). Highly differing views among stakeholders 
(commercial fishermen, recreational fishermen, policy makers, environmental 
organizations) on issues concerning exploitation of the fishery are not uncommon. 
Indeed, one of the aims of this thesis is, within the framework of the research 
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questions, to provide a comprehensive overview of the past, present and future 
economic and biological circumstances of the commercial salmon fisheries in the 
northern Baltic Sea.  
 
In the project the focus is on two market failures associated with fisheries. Market 
failures prevent free markets from producing economically efficient outcomes, i.e. 
they prevent efficient allocation of resources (Hanley, Shogren & White 2001, 16). 
One market failure is the environmental damage that arises from fishing vessels’ use 
of fossil fuels. Since the tax-free fuel does not include the external cost of this 
environmental damage, the private consumption of fuel will be higher than what is 
socially optimal. This sort of market failure is known as a negative externality. The 
other market failure is the common-property problem of fisheries. This is a situation, 
where open access to a fishery and the lack of regulation will result in excess effort 
and overfishing. Both these market failures and the means to address them are dealt 
with throughout the thesis. From here on, I refer to policies directed at the fuel use 
externality as fuel cost policy or climate change management, and to policies directed 
at the common pool problem as fisheries management. 
 
1.2  Research methodology and thesis structure 
 
In our research project we ask what the consequences to different fisheries would be if 
an additional cost is imposed on fuel, i.e. if the fuel subsidy to fisheries is removed. 
This means that the fishing enterprises would pay for the external cost, which is a 
result of their use of fossil fuels. To this end, we introduce four fuel cost scenarios 
upon which the analysis is built. The scenarios are presented in Table 1, and will be 
described in more detail later on. The current situation is represented by data on the 
factual economic performance of the fishery. Baseline represents the present situation 
where fuel use is subject to neither taxation nor emissions trading. EU is a cost from a 
situation where the fishery operates within an emissions trading system. Stern is a tax 
based on an estimation of the social cost of CO2 emissions. National is the cost from 
national fuel taxes. The first three scenarios are the same for all national case studies, 
whereas the fourth scenario varies according to country-specific fuel tax legislation. 
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Table 1. Fuel cost scenarios. 
 
Scenario  Definition 
0. Current situation - 
1. Baseline Fuel use exempt from costs  
2. EU EU CO2 quota price in 2009 
3. Stern Social cost of CO2 
4. National Finnish fuel tax in 2009 
 
 
I will study the effect of removing fuel tax concessions on the salmon fishery by 
comparing the four policy scenarios with the current situation. The current situation is 
the result of present fisheries management. In the four policy scenarios, on the other 
hand, I will apply optimal management and maximize the net present value (NPV) of 
the fishery assuming the different fuel costs. I will also look at the impact from 
introducing fuel costs under current management. I am mainly interested in effects on 
fishing effort and NPV of the fishery, but also fuel consumption and fuel efficiency as 
well as CO2 emissions are considered. Also the sustainability of the salmon fishery is 
discussed. 
 
In this context, fisheries management implies the amount of effort that is allowed in 
the fishery. For example, in an open access fishery there would be no restraint on 
effort. Optimal management, on the other hand, means finding an efficient level of 
effort that will maximize the NPV of the fishery given economic and biological 
realities, such as fishing costs and salmon reproduction dynamics. Fisheries economic 
theory provides different solutions for reaching optimal management, and some of 
these are briefly presented in the next chapter. However, in this thesis I will not 
propose means for reaching the desired level of effort; I will merely suggest what this 
level should be. The regulatory measures are implicit in the concept of optimal 
management. 
 
A useful tool in the study of fisheries is the bioeconomic model. In this study I will 
use a bioeconomic model in the optimization of the fishery, and to compare the 
economic performance in the different scenarios. Essential input into the model is 
economic and biological data that relate to the salmon fishery, and specifically to the 
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River Tornionjoki stock. Central output of this specific model is effort, NPV, harvest 
and steady state fish stock. The unit of effort employed in Baltic salmon assessment 
and in this analysis is geardays, which is obtained by multiplying the number of 
fishing days with the number of gear (trapnets) (see e.g. ICES 2012a, 21). Other 
indicators that are considered in the analysis, but which are not obtained as output 
from the model, are fleet size, employment, fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. 
These are obtained through different estimation procedures, which will be described in 
the analysis chapter. 
 
The framework of the study is illustrated in Figure 1, which portrays the premises and 
aims of this thesis. The fishery produces benefits to society, but also externalities in 
form of CO2 emissions and overfishing. Society can address these problems with 
policy instruments (solid arrow), but the overall impacts of these measures are not 
known (dashed arrow). Science, in turn, can address this knowledge gap with the aid 
of theory and empirical analysis. In this case the goal is to elicit the consequences to 
the Baltic salmon fishery from having it to account for the emission externalities from 
its direct fishing operations. Energy use in capture fisheries is mainly the direct use of 
fuel to power fishing vessels (Cheilari et al. 2013, 18; OECD 2013, 5).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Framework of the study. Science can provide information to policy makers on how to address 
the problem of fuel use externalities in fisheries. 
 
This thesis is laid out as follows. Next, I will elaborate on fuel subsidies in fisheries 
and on their removal, i.e. the implementation of appropriate climate change 
management measures. Fuel tax concessions both internationally and in Finland are 
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discussed here, as well as management of both climate and fisheries. I will finish 
chapter 2 with a literature review on Baltic salmon bioeconomics as an introduction to 
practical fisheries management. In chapter 3, I will give a quite comprehensive 
presentation of the Baltic salmon fishery. The biological and economic issues brought 
up here are important with respect to the actual analysis in chapter 4. This chapter will, 
however, commence with a more thorough presentation of the fuel cost scenarios. 
Afterwards, the bioeconomic model is presented. Finally, a presentation of the results 
(latter part of chapter 4) and the conclusions of the study (chapter 5) will conclude the 
thesis. For the interested reader, a more in depth description of the salmon population 
dynamics can be found in Appendix A. Additionally, a detailed description of the 
procedure behind the estimation of fishing costs can be found in Appendix B.  
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2 Fuel Subsidies and Environmental Management of 
Fisheries 
 
Fuel subsidies exacerbate the aforementioned externalities in fisheries by increasing 
both fuel consumption and fishing effort. Fuel subsidies in both the international 
context and in Finnish fisheries are discussed in the first section of the chapter. In the 
second section I will discuss the policy measures available for addressing market 
failures in fisheries, and provide a theoretical account of the effect of fuel tax 
concessions under different fisheries management regimes. I will conclude the chapter 
with an introduction to bioeconomic analysis of Baltic salmon fisheries. 
 
2.1 Fuel subsidies: Tax concessions for the fishing industry 
 
Fisheries subsidies are direct or indirect financial support from governments to the 
fishing sector (Sumaila 2013, 251). Subsidies can be directed to both the markets of 
fisheries output (fish) and input (factors of production, e.g. fuel) (Martini 2012, 7). 
The definitions and classifications of fisheries subsidies may vary, since no single 
agreement on what defines a subsidy or how it should be measured exists (Khan et al. 
2006, 13). Nevertheless, fuel tax exemptions or concessions are defined as a subsidy 
by both the OECD and WTO (OECD 2006, 20). 
 
Khan et al. (2006, 13-16) identify good, bad and ugly subsidies depending on the 
subsidy’s impact on the sustainability of the fishery resource. Good subsidies will lead 
to investments that promote optimal resource use. Such subsidies are for example 
investments in research and fisheries management programs. Some subsidies are tied 
to environmental protection, such as fishing vessel buyback programs (Shrank 2003, 
9), which are meant to reduce overcapacity and fishing pressure. However, a study by 
Clark, Munro & Sumaila (2005) showed that, when anticipated by the fishermen, 
buybacks would likely be harmful to both resource protection and economic 
performance. Vessel buyback programs are consequently defined as ugly subsidies, 
since their effectiveness in protecting the fish resource is highly questionable. Tax 
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exemptions, on the other hand, is a bad subsidy, since they enhance overcapacity and 
overfishing through higher profits for the fishers (Khan et al. 2006, 15-16)1. 
Furthermore, support to fuel use will have environmental effects besides those on the 
target fish stock. These effects, for example higher greenhouse gas emissions, should 
also be taken into account and given proper attention (OECD 2005, 45). 
 
The majority of governmental support to fuel use is given in the form of tax 
concessions (expenditures), as opposed to budgetary expenditures. Tax concessions are 
financial transfers achieved by reducing tax obligations with regard to some 
benchmark tax.  Tax concessions for the fisheries sector are usually implemented by 
providing reduced rates, rebates or tax exemptions. These concessions can concern 
value added taxes (VAT) or, more commonly, excise taxes directed at specific fuels. 
All OECD countries have imposed excise taxes on some fossil fuels. (Martini 2012, 
7.)  
 
A special case of support within the EU has been the de minimis regulation for 
fisheries. The de minimis aid has granted support to fishing firms of up to €30 000 per 
three-year period. The aid is not allowed to be used to increase fishing capacity, but 
can be used to cover variable costs from the use of fishing vessels, such as fuel 
consumption. It is estimated that EU fishers spent €1.8 billion on fuel in 2008. From 
this follows, that the de minimis aid could potentially cover approximately 13% of the 
EU fleet’s fuel costs in 2008. (Martini 2012, 23-24.) 
 
Fuel tax concessions represent substantial amounts of money in many countries. 
Sumaila et al. (2006, 47) estimate that fuel subsidies account for about 25% of total 
fisheries subsidies. The estimated total value of fuel tax concessions in OECD 
countries was €1.5 billion in 2008. The total amount of fuel consumed amounted to 9.3 
billion liters, which includes also non-subsidized fuel (Martini 2012, 10).  
 
Fuel tax concessions are often motivated with reasons related to competitiveness. That 
is, domestic fisheries need to be supported in order to withstand international 
                                                               
1
 Khan et al. (2006) is a study on non-fuel subsidies, and does not therefore consider fuel tax 
exemptions. The rationale behind the classification will, however, apply for fuel tax exemptions as well.  
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competition. In the past, high fuel prices have motivated fuel tax concessions in many 
countries. This is the case particularly in countries with high tax rates on fuel. 
Furthermore, fuel prices have been very volatile in recent years, which can make a 
removal of fuel tax concessions more difficult (Martini 2012, 14-15&20). 
Nevertheless, Martini (2012, 21) argues that support that is not dependent on the use 
of inputs, such as fuel, can be a more effective way of income transferal. Support 
based on income is likely to be more efficient, since it leads to fewer market 
distortions.  
 
Fuel tax concessions in the Finnish fishing sector 
 
As a member of the EU, Finland is bound by the Energy Taxation Directive, which 
defines the energy products and lays down the minimum fuel taxation levels in the 
Member States. However, fuels that are used in certain activities and processes are 
exempt from taxes. These include fuels used as energy sources in oil refining 
processes, fuels used in industrial production as raw material, fuels used in the 
production of goods, fuels used in production of electricity and fuels used for aviation 
and vessel traffic in other than private leisure use. Commercial fishing falls under this 
last category. (Finnish Customs 2013a, 1&3.)  
 
In the EU, the Energy Taxation Directive also lays down the rules for tax exemptions. 
The Directive states that commercial fishing activities can be exempted from fuel 
taxes in Community waters. In Finland, this is stated in Article 9 of the Act on Excise 
Duty on Liquid Fuels. The tax exemption covers the full value of the excise duty on 
fuel. (Martini 2012, 23&25.) 
 
Only fishing vessels used in professional fishing are exempt from fuel taxes. In the 
Finnish Fishing Act, a professional fisher is defined as a person who earns at least 30% 
of the regular total income from fishing and processing of the catch. Additionally, a 
professional fisher has to be included in the register of professional fishermen. Also 
the vessels used in professional fishing need to be included in the register for fishing 
vessels. Vessels are registered as coastal fishing vessels (less than 12 in meters length) 
or offshore fishing vessels (at least 12 meters in length). These registrations must be 
valid when acquiring or using tax-free fuel. The registers are maintained by the 
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Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY Centres), as 
well as the Government of Åland in the Åland Islands. (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry 2005; ELY Centre 2011; Finnish Customs 2013b, 2.) 
 
The tax exemption is usually implemented through a refund, which is paid to the fuel 
user upon application. The refund consists of the total amount of the excise duty at the 
time of purchase. The refund is applied for from the Customs. Application for refund 
can be done once or twice a year. In the case of certain vessels, it is a possible to 
acquire tax-free fuel directly from an authorized warehouse keeper. This concerns 
certain diesel-powered vessels that run on light or heavy fuel oil. The fishing vessels 
that this rule applies to are trawlers and vessels of at least 15 meters in length. Fishers, 
who acquire tax-free fuel in this way, must each year report to the Customs the 
quantities of fuel purchased and used. Furthermore, the fishers are obligated to keep 
accounts of the quantities of tax-free fuel acquired and used. (Finnish Customs 2013a, 
12; Finnish Customs 2013b, 6.) 
 
In Finland, the fuel tax exemptions for professional fishers amounted to €310 000 in 
2008 and €260 000 in 2009 (OECD 2012, 229). Table 2 exhibits the values of tax 
concessions and volumes of fuel consumed in the Finnish fishing sector in 2008. 
 
Table 2. Fuel tax concessions for Finnish fisheries, 2008. 
Source: data from Martini 2012, 25. 
 
Fuel type Tax concession value, € Fuel consumed, l 
Motor gasoline 234 600 374 400 
Diesel oil 5 700 15 800 
Fuel oil 72 400 836 500 
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2.2 Taxes and quotas as instruments in environmental policy 
 
2.2.1 Climate change management 
 
Taxation of fuel is one of many ways for governments to collect tax revenue in order 
to fund public spending. Motor fuel taxes are especially suitable for this purpose due 
to the relatively low elasticity of fuel demand in the short run. This means that a price 
increase in fuel tends to have only a modest effect on demand. However, fuel taxes 
may also be used as a policy instrument, with the aim of steering behavior in a certain 
direction (OECD 2011, 2&6). The price elasticity of fuel is in fact quite high in the 
long run, which means that fuel taxes can be a powerful instrument in environmental 
policy. Historically, however, environmental considerations have not been the primary 
reason for imposing taxes on fuel (Sterner 2006, 3194-95).   
 
The stated reasons or motives for fuel taxes may vary considerably (Sterner 2006, 
3195). The purpose of raising revenue and environmental reasons has been mentioned. 
In some countries, fuel taxes are earmarked for specific purposes, such as road 
building and maintenance. This, in turn, is sometimes used as an explanation to why 
certain sectors are exempt from fuel taxes. Fishing vessels, for example, do not 
operate on publicly financed roads, therefore making the fishing sector’s contribution 
to the tax base unmotivated (Martini 2012, 9; OECD 2012, 52). 
 
Taxes that are used in environmental policy are called environmental taxes. Overall, 
environmentally related taxes account for about 5% of total tax revenue in OECD 
countries (OECD 2011, 8). An environmental tax is for example the corrective or 
Pigovian tax. It is designed to take into account the negative externalities of certain 
actions (for example the use of motor fuel), so that the cost of the environmental 
damage is incorporated into market prices, and therefore affects the decisions of the 
consumers (Hanley et al. 2001, 29). The size of the tax should ideally correspond to 
the scope of the environmental damage. Several countries have implemented 
considerable taxes on fuel because of the negative effects associated with the use of 
fossil fuels, such as global warming and air pollution (OECD 2011, 1-2). In Europe, 
the policy of high fuel taxation has restrained growth in fuel demand, resulting in 
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lower CO2 emissions. These policies in Europe and other high tax countries have had 
a detectable effect on the carbon content of the atmosphere. Therefore, a discussion of 
an extension of the use of fuel tax policies to other sectors, notably industry, is called 
for (Sterner 2006, 3201). 
 
An alternative to putting a price on CO2 emissions via a tax is to restrain the quantity 
of emissions allowed, and to let the actors trade the rights to emit on the open market. 
This is the idea behind tradable quotas and emissions markets, which will in effect 
create a value to the CO2 emissions as well. When a restricted amount of emission 
permits is allocated to the market actors, who are allowed to buy and sell these permits 
freely, an incentive to pollute less is created. The idea of tradable permits was 
introduced in the mid-1960s and first implemented in the 1990s (Hanley et al. 2001, 
30-31).  An example of a tradable permit market is the European Emissions Trading 
System (ETS), which was launched in 2005. The system covers about 45% of the 
greenhouse gas emissions in the EU, including primarily the power generation and 
manufacturing industry (European Commission 2013a). The fishing sector is an 
industry, which has not been subject to climate policies, such as emissions trading or 
taxation. 
 
2.2.2 Fisheries management 
 
Management and regulation are required in order to achieve desired biological and 
economic objectives of a fishery (Clark 1990, 245). Managing fisheries is often a 
question about regulating fishing capacity or fishing effort. Capacity comprises 
primarily the number and size of fishing vessels, whereas effort is related to the use of 
vessels in fishing activity. Regulation measures may be divided into input (effort) and 
output (catch) regulations, as well as technical regulations. Fisher licenses, effort 
quotas and engine power limitations are examples of input controls. Output controls 
are represented by different kinds of harvest quotas, such as quotas on total harvest 
and individual fisher quotas. Technical regulations include gear regulations, minimum 
fish size and restricted fishing seasons and areas (Flaaten 2010, 30-31). 
 
Open access is a theoretically important concept in fisheries economics, but largely 
non-existent in national fisheries. In OECD countries most fisheries can be 
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characterized as regulated open access fisheries or, increasingly so, as quota fisheries. 
In the former, regulations may include total allowable catch (TAC), permissions and 
technical regulations. In the latter, quotas may be allocated to individual fishers or 
vessels or to fisher/vessel groups (Martini 2012, 16). However, the biological and 
economic outcomes of different management strategies are not necessarily obvious to 
the fisheries manager (Clark 1990, 245). 
 
There is no one ideal solution to optimal management of fisheries. Individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) have admittedly many advantages, particularly in the 
ability to produce economically efficient outcomes in the long run. Nonetheless, there 
are also problems associated with ITQs, relating to initial quota allocation as well as to 
monitoring and enforcement. However, other common management measures, such as 
limited entry or TACs, are problematic since they do not succeed in maintaining 
profitable fisheries over the long term. As a side note it can be mentioned that 
taxation, although not used in practical fisheries management, produces the same 
economically efficient outcome as ITQs. However, with taxation the resource rents 
from the fishery are picked up by the taxation authority and not by the fishermen. 
(Clark 1990, 255&259-260.) 
 
2.2.3 Fuel subsidies and fisheries management  
 
The effect of tax concessions on the fishery will depend on the management system in 
place. In this section, I will look at the effect of fuel subsidies on the fishery from a 
theoretical point of view. A natural starting point in this sort of analysis is the open 
access fishery. In the Nordic countries the most commonly used management scheme 
is property rights in different quota systems, such as ITQs (Waldo et al. 2013, 10), 
therefore the case of ITQ management is also examined. Last, I will look at the TAC 
managed fishery, since the salmon fisheries in the Baltic Sea are managed through a 
TAC. 
 
In open access, fuel subsidies lower the cost of fishing, resulting in increased effort 
and lower stock level at equilibrium. The subsidies do not lead to bigger profits for the 
fishers, because the profits are competed away through the increased effort. On the 
other hand, a removal of the fuel subsidies might force some of the less efficient 
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fishers to leave the fishery, which in turn could increase profitability for the remaining 
fishers. However, according to fisheries economic theory, in an unregulated fishery 
effort will continue to increase as long as revenues are positive. This will go on until 
total revenues equal total costs, a state called the bionomic equilibrium. In this 
situation both industry profits and resource rents have been depleted. This feature of 
the open access fishery was first described by Gordon (1954). (Khan et al. 2006, 14; 
Martini 2012, 16.) 
 
Under fishing quota schemes (e.g. ITQs) fuel subsidies are not likely to affect the 
number of fish caught by individual fishermen. Possible higher profits would be 
capitalized into the value of the fishing quotas. However, there may occur substitution 
of factors of production, if this is economically rational. For example, fuel support 
could be an incentive to fish for longer periods of time, but with less gear or 
manpower. Substitution of production factors might also take place in fisheries 
regulated with effort controls. For example, if number of fishing days is limited, 
fishers could switch to bigger vessels or more powerful engines. This might in fact 
raise the total fishing effort, and simultaneously lead to higher greenhouse gas 
emissions. (Martini 2012, 17-18.) 
 
A binding TAC system represents the situation of the Baltic salmon fisheries 
management. This situation is shown graphically with a basic Gordon-Schaefer 
bioeconomic model in Figure 2. Here there are two possible scenarios. If there is a 
limited entry, positive profits can be earned from the fishery. The size of the profits 
will be determined by the level at which the TAC is set. If the TAC is set at maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY), profits in the initial situation will be R-C1, and with fuel tax 
concessions R-C2. This implies that a fuel subsidy under this kind of management 
would lead to increased profits, because costs are lower but effort and stock levels are 
unchanged. (Martini 2012, 16.) 
 
On the other hand, if entry is unlimited, profits are expected to be competed away, as 
in open access. This is not because of increased effort (the TAC prevents that), but 
because the unlimited entry would bid up the costs of inputs such as fishing vessels. 
Thus, a fuel subsidy would lower variable costs, but then be capitalized into the value 
of fixed fishing costs. This is illustrated in Figure 2, with the cost curve TC3 
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intersecting the revenue curve TR at TAC/MSY. In this situation a removal of fuel 
subsidies could prove difficult, since the fishers have invested the value of the 
subsidies in capital and would suffer real losses if the subsidies were removed. 
(Martini 2012, 17-18.) 
 
 
Figure 2. The effect of fuel tax concessions under TAC management. 
Source: modified from Martini 2012, 17. 
 
Finally, the issues of climate change management and fisheries management in the 
context of this study is illustrated in Figure 3. Again, we have the basic bioeconomic 
model with effort on the x-axis and revenues and costs to the fishery on the y-axis. 
The figure shows to what extent effort is reduced and the impact on profits from 
optimizing the fishery and removing fuel tax concessions, respectively. In this 
example, the effect on effort and revenues is larger from moving to optimal 
management (maximum economic yield) than when accounting for the emission 
externality. However, this will depend on the extent of the externality and the state of 
current fisheries management, i.e. if the fishery is closer to open access (EOA) or 
optimal management (E*) (Waldo et al. 2013, 12). The comparison of the relative size 
of these effects in a particular fishery is an empirical question. 
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Figure 3. The impact of climate change management and fisheries management on effort, costs and 
revenues in a fishery. 
Source: modified from Waldo et al. 2013, 11. 
 
2.3 Bioeconomic modeling as a tool in practical fisheries management 
 
In the previous section I utilized a bioeconomic model to describe basic features of a 
fishery in order to predict results of certain management actions. Fisheries 
bioeconomics studies the relationships between fish stocks and the enterprises that 
exploit them. Areas of interest are among others fish population dynamics, the 
relationship between harvest and stock size and, given prices and costs, the 
relationship between fishing effort and profits. Naturally, these are issues that will vary 
depending on the characteristics of the fishery, such as type of the fish stock or the 
harvest technique used (Anderson & Seijo 2010, 12). For example, Atlantic salmon is 
a migratory fish species that is caught mainly with passive gear. I will here review 
some previous bioeconomic studies on Baltic salmon fisheries, which thus take into 
account the distinct features of this specific fishery. 
 
The Baltic salmon fishery is characterized by its sequential nature, i.e. the salmon is 
targeted by different fisheries during its life cycle. Therefore, the question of optimal 
allocation of catch between the different fisheries has been an essential research topic. 
Laukkanen (2001) developed a bioeconomic model in order to find the optimal 
allocation of the northern Baltic salmon catch between offshore, inshore, estuary and 
recreational river fisheries. The results suggested substantial gains from moving to 
optimal management, which would mean a closure of almost all commercial fishing 
and a reallocation of the catch to recreational use. For future studies on catch 
 18 
allocation, the author called for more information on the value of recreational river 
fishing. 
 
Research on the optimal management of sequential Baltic salmon fisheries was 
continued by Kulmala, Laukkanen & Michielsens (2008b). This study presented a 
bioeconomic model that coupled economic models with the age-structured stock 
assessment models currently used by ICES for providing management advice. This 
was done in order to bridge the gap between economics and biology, and thus address 
the issue of overrepresentation of natural science as the basis of present salmon 
management. A numerical analysis was conducted with data from the River Simojoki 
salmon stock, which included valuation data on the benefits of recreational harvest. 
This study also found that net benefits from the salmon fishery could be increased 
markedly by reallocation of the catch. In this case all offshore fisheries would be 
closed down and only the coastal trapnet and river fisheries would remain active. 
 
Both aforementioned studies assumed that the fishery is managed by a single authority. 
A game theoretic approach to the subject was adopted by Laukkanen (2003), where the 
cooperative and non-cooperative behavior of two fleets under recruitment uncertainty 
was studied. In the paper by Kulmala et al. (2008a) the bioeconomic study of the 
Baltic salmon fishery was extended and carried out in an international context. The 
researchers used game theoretical methods to study the Baltic salmon fishery using 
biological data from 21 salmon stocks and economic data from four countries fishing 
with different types of gear in the Baltic Sea region. This study as well found 
substantial gains from moving to optimal management, where the four countries 
cooperate with the common goal to maximize the net present value of the fishery. If 
the fishery had been managed in this optimal way, the authors claim that the NPV 
during the period 1995-2005 would have amounted to €3.3 million, instead of the 
factual loss of €3.7 million. 
 
Newer studies on the optimal management of Baltic salmon include e.g. Kulmala et al. 
(2013), where the game theoretical application is further developed. It is shown that 
the current international management is nonoptimal, and that the equilibrium is in fact 
full non-cooperation. A somewhat different approach, than all the above mentioned, to 
the matter of salmon management can be found in Holma, Kulmala & Lindroos  
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(2013). Here the optimal management of conflicting species, namely grey seal and 
salmon, in the Baltic Sea is studied. The topic is highly relevant because of the 
negative effects that seals have had on the coastal Baltic salmon fisheries. The target 
of the study was, as is in this thesis, the River Tornionjoki wild salmon stock. 
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3 The Atlantic salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea 
 
In this chapter I will review the Baltic Sea salmon fishery. A special emphasis will be 
put on the River Tornionjoki stock, which is the target of my study.  I will begin by 
looking at the biological aspects of the salmon stocks. From there, I will move on to a 
discussion of the fishery from an economic and social point of view. Here I will 
address matters relating to the fishing and management of the Baltic salmon stocks. 
The focus will be on the Finnish commercial salmon fisheries. Many of the biological 
and economic issues brought up here will play a key role when presenting the 
bioeconomic model and conducting the analysis in the next chapter. 
 
3.1 The Baltic salmon fish stocks 
 
The Atlantic salmon living in the Baltic Sea is geographically and genetically isolated 
from the North Atlantic salmon populations. Migration between the two areas is not 
common (Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 329; Romakkaniemi 2008, 6). Salmon is an 
anadromous fish species, which means its life cycle consists of both marine and fresh 
water (river) phases (Kulmala et al. 2008a, 5). In the past, salmon is known to have 
inhabited about 100 rivers in the Baltic drainage area. Today, wild salmon stocks can 
be found in less than 30 rivers. The decrease in the number of spawning rivers has 
been caused by human activities, such as pollution, damming and overfishing 
(Romakkaniemi 2008, 6). For Scandinavian salmon stocks, the rapid expansion of 
hydroelectric power production since the 1940s has been especially detrimental 
(Karlsson & Karlström 1994, 66). Hydropower companies are therefore obligated to 
release reared juvenile salmon, called smolts, in order to compensate for losses in wild 
smolt production (Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 329-330). All Baltic salmon stocks are 
listed as endangered (FGFRI 2013b). 
 
The northern Baltic Sea consists of the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland. The 
northernmost part of the Gulf of Bothnia is called the Bothnian Bay. It is here where 
the River Tornionjoki flows into the Gulf of Bothnia. The Baltic Main Basin refers to 
the central and southern parts of the Baltic Sea (Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 330). My 
area of interest is the Gulf of Bothnia and the Main Basin, which constitute the 
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migration and feeding grounds for northern Baltic salmon stocks (Karlsson & 
Karlström 1994, 64). Here the salmon is also targeted by fisheries (see Figure 4). Of 
the original nearly 50 wild salmon rivers flowing into the Gulf of Bothnia, only 13 
rivers remain (Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 329). In Finland, wild salmon stocks can 
today only be found in the rivers Tornionjoki and Simojoki (FGFRI 2013b). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Migration routes and main fisheries of northern Baltic salmon stocks. 
Source: modified from Kulmala et al. 2008b, 717. 
 
The River Tornionjoki salmon stock 
 
The River Tornionjoki is the northernmost river basin flowing into the Bothnian Bay, 
and it runs along the national border between Finland and Sweden. The River 
Tornionjoki is the largest unregulated river system in Western Europe, and also one of 
the largest spawning rivers for Atlantic salmon in the world. Accounting for about 
30% of the wild smolt migration, it is the largest producer of wild salmon in the Baltic 
Sea. The Tornionjoki salmon stock was especially weak in the 1980s, and was even 
considered to be close to extinction. In the 1990s, however, the stock showed signs of 
rapid recovery, largely because of stricter fisheries regulation in the Baltic Sea. Today, 
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the River Tornionjoki produces a salmon catch of several hundreds of thousands 
kilograms per year to the fishermen in the Baltic Sea region. (Romakkaniemi 2008, 
6&9; FGFRI 2013a).   
 
Already in the 1970s, fisheries scientists and managers in Finland and Sweden had 
become concerned about the decline in northern Baltic salmon stocks. Therefore, a 
Finnish-Swedish hatchery program for reared Tornionjoki salmon was established to 
secure smolt production. Annual smolt stocking increased throughout the 1980s, and 
peaked in the late 1990s. In 2002, however, stocking of reared salmon in River 
Tornionjoki was abolished, because the stock was considered sufficiently recovered 
(Romakkaniemi 2008, 9). Overall, there has been a significant increase in total wild 
smolt production in the northern rivers of the Baltic Sea. It is worth mentioning that 
the present wild smolt production is always dependent on the spawning runs several 
years ago (ICES 2013a, 1).   
 
The life cycle of Baltic salmon 
 
Any further exploration of the salmon fishery in the Baltic Sea warrants a look into the 
life pattern of salmon. This information is crucial for understanding fishing and 
management practices. Figure 5 illustrates the life cycle stages, and sums up the more 
detailed description that follows below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The different freshwater and marine stages of Atlantic salmon. 
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Wild salmon spawn in September to November in rivers with rapids. Fecundity is 
assumed to be about 1100-1200 eggs per kg female. For rivers flowing into the Gulf of 
Bothnia, hatching occurs in April-May. The newly hatched alevins receive 
nourishment from the yolk sac. The next stage, called fry, starts external feeding in 
May-June. The subsequent parr stage is territorial, and lasts throughout the freshwater 
phase.  In River Tornionjoki the parr stage lasts for 2-6 years. This phase ends when 
the smolt feeding migration to the sea commences in the spring. The feeding grounds 
are reached by the end of the year. (Karlsson & Karlström 1994, 62-63; 
Romakkaniemi 2008, 8.) 
 
The post-smolt survival greatly influences later abundance of salmon in the sea. Post-
smolt mortality means mortality during the first year of feeding migration (FGFRI 
2011b, 45) Factors that are known to affect post-smolt survival are herring and seal 
abundance. Herring are food for smolts and seals, in turn, feed on smolts. Also 
changes in sea temperature may influence post-smolt survival. It can be noted that 
decreased post-smolt survival has undone some of the positive effects on salmon 
abundance that is a result of decreased exploitation rates since the 1990s. Post-smolt 
survival declined throughout the 1990s up until the mid-2000s, after which 
improvements have been noticed (ICES 2013a, 1-2). 
 
The Main Basin is the primary feeding area for almost all Baltic salmon stocks. 
However, a minor proportion of the Gulf of Bothnia stocks stays within the Bothnian 
Sea. When the salmon has reached a length of about 25 cm, they start eating fish. Sprat 
is the main food in the Main Basin, while herring is more common in the Gulf of 
Bothnia. The feeding period for the Tornionjoki salmon lasts for 1-4 years, after which 
they start their spawning migration to their native river along the coast of the Gulf of 
Bothnia. The migration begins in April-June, and the salmon enter the river from June 
to August. The majority of the spawners are multi-sea-winter (MSW) spawners, i.e. 
salmon that has spent more than one winter at sea. These MSW spawners ascend the 
river from June to mid-July. Salmon that has spent only one winter at sea, known as 
grilse, enter the river later, in July and August. Repeat spawners are rare because of the 
fishing pressure, and normally account for 5-10% of the spawners. (Karlsson & 
Karlström 1994, 64; Romakkaniemi 2008, 8-9.) 
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The M742 syndrome is a reproductive disturbance that has been detected among Baltic 
salmon since 1974. M74 affects females that return to the rivers to spawn. Mortality 
among the offspring of affected females is nearly 100% (Karlsson & Karlström 1994, 
77). Mortality caused by M74 increased rapidly in the 1990s, but decreased in the 
2000s (FGFRI 2013b). In 2011, the proportion of Baltic salmon females whose 
offspring suffered from M74 was on average 5%. For River Tornionjoki these figures 
in 2009 and 2010 were 4% and 12%, respectively (ICES 2013b, 129). The mortality 
levels vary among different rivers (Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 333). Prediction of 
future mortality rates is difficult, since the exact cause of the syndrome is still 
unknown. Because M74 mortality has varied in the past, similar variations can also be 
expected in the future (European Commission 2009, 8). 
 
The scientific assessment of salmon stocks 
 
The sustainable harvest of fish requires accurate information about fish population 
dynamics. The gathering of this information is called fisheries stock assessment 
(Kuparinen et al. 2012, 135). In the case of Baltic salmon, knowledge on the status of 
salmon stocks is needed as the basis for sustainable management practices. ICES 
provides stock assessments for the Baltic Sea salmon fisheries. ICES advises that the 
salmon fishery management should be stock-specific, i.e. based on the status of 
individual river stocks (ICES 2013a, 1). To this end, ICES has established assessment 
units, where stocks in the same unit exhibit similar biological and genetic 
characteristics as well as similar migration patterns. Since these stocks are targeted by 
the same fisheries, they are expected to respond similarly to the same kind of 
management. For example, the River Tornionjoki is part of an assessment unit 
containing the northeastern Bothnian Bay salmon stocks (ICES 2013a, 7-8). 
 
In the evaluation of stock status ICES uses the smolt production in individual rivers 
compared to the potential smolt production capacity (PSPC). Reaching a smolt 
production of at least 75% of the PSPC has been suggested as the goal if salmon 
populations are to be sustained at an MSY-level (ICES 2012b, 1&4). Thus, the advice 
                                                               
2
 ”M” stands for ”miljö” (the Swedish word for environment), suggesting that the cause of the 
syndrome is some environmental factor. “74” refers to the year the syndrome was first detected 
(Karlsson & Karlström 1994, 77).  
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provided by ICES is based on an MSY approach. According to a survey done by ICES 
in 2011, River Tornionjoki, and several other rivers flowing into the Bothnian Bay, 
have stocks approximately at the MSY-level. However, ICES has advised that the 
fishing mortality for these stocks should not be allowed to increase (FGFRI 2011b, 6).  
 
The scientific basis for the stock projections is a Bayesian state-space assessment 
model. The Bayesian modeling framework allows for different sources of information 
to be included in the model, which makes it biologically more realistic (Kuparinen et 
al. 2012, 136). Bayesian methods for Baltic salmon stock assessment have been used 
in several studies, for example in Mäntyniemi & Romakkaniemi (2002) Michielsens et 
al. (2006) and Michielsens et al. (2008). The former study by Michielsens et al. 
presents a model that has been implemented by ICES’ Assessment Working Group on 
Baltic Salmon and Trout (WGBAST). It is also used in e.g. Kulmala et al. (2008a, 
2008b), and is also applied in this thesis. I will return to the topic of population 
modeling in chapter 4. 
 
Input data in the ICES model include catch and effort data, electrofishing surveys, 
smolt-trapping, spawner counts and tag returns from fisheries. The PSPC estimations 
are based on information provided by experts and estimates on stock-recruit 
relationships. The Bayesian approach makes it possible to express uncertainties in the 
model as probability distributions. One important uncertainty associated with the 
model is post-smolt survival. Also the incorporation of misreporting and unreporting 
of salmon landings causes uncertainty in the modeling, but simultaneously improves 
the assessment. This unaccounted fishing has a notable effect on ICES’ catch 
recommendations (ICES 2013a, 1&6-7). For example, in 2011 about 30% of the total 
salmon catch was estimated to be mis- or unreported (ICES 2012b, 1). 
 
The spawning runs into Tornionjoki have been monitored since 2009 using a sonar 
technique known as DIDSON3. The recorded number of ascending Tornionjoki salmon 
in 2009-2012 has been as follows: 31 800, 17 200, 23 100 and 61 500 salmon (ICES 
2013b, 72-73). The primary reason for the weak spawning runs in 2010 and 2011 was 
                                                               
3
 Dual frequency IDentification SONar. 
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probably cold winter conditions, which postpones the maturation of salmon. This is 
likely to result in a weaker smolt production in the near future (ICES 2013a, 1-2). 
 
3.2 Fishing of Baltic salmon 
 
Salmon fishing in the past and present 
 
Salmon fishing in the Baltic Sea was originally mainly river fishing, where the 
ascending spawners were targeted. The river fishery dominated until the end of the 
19th century (Karlsson & Karlström 1994, 69), after which the exploitation moved 
gradually to the sea. The offshore fishery, which targets feeding salmon, became the 
dominant type of fishery during the latter half of the 20th century. Since the 1980s, 
however, coastal and river fisheries have increased their proportion of the total catch 
(Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 331). In Finland, the majority of the commercial catch is 
taken by coastal fisheries (ICES 2013a, 10). The coastal fishery targets the salmon that 
are migrating to their spawning rivers (Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 331). Thus, Baltic 
salmon is harvested by different fisheries along its whole migration route 
(Romakkaniemi 2008, 9) (see Figure 4). The major part of the catch consists of wild 
salmon, which accounts for over two thirds of the catch in the Gulf of Bothnia. The 
amount of reared salmon in catches has decreased since the mid-1990s. In the past 
years, the largest share of the Baltic salmon catches have been reported by Finnish and 
Swedish professional fishermen (FGFRI 2011b, 21&52).  
 
Total catches of salmon in the Baltic Sea was 1139 tons in 2012. The Finnish 
commercial marine salmon catch was 330 tons (FGFRI 2013c, 12). Figure 6 shows 
how the Finnish catches have declined since 1990 (2 058 tons), and how they were at 
their lowest level in 2010 (215 tons). This has been the trend for the whole Baltic Sea 
salmon fishery (ICES 2013b, 9). The decreasing exploitation rates have been 
explained by e.g. the adoption of stricter regulatory measures and by the increased 
damages to catch and gear caused by seals (ICES 2013a, 2). Additionally, some fishing 
methods have recently been prohibited. 
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Figure 6. The Finnish commercial marine salmon catch in 1980-2012. 
Source: data from FGFRI 2011b, 53. 
 
Figure 7 shows the salmon catches in the Gulf of Bothnia in the 2000s, as number of 
salmon. This data includes catches from the Archipelago Sea, which is situated south 
of the Gulf of Bothnia between the Åland Islands and the mainland. It appears as the 
catches have varied quite a lot during the last decade in the study area. 
 
  
Figure 7. Gulf of Bothnia salmon catch in 2000-2012. 
Source: data from Pakarinen 2013, personal communication. 
 
The Finnish commercial catch amounted to a value of €1.0 million in 2012. In recent 
years the annual landings value has varied between €1-1.2 million (FGFRI 2013d). 
The producer price for wild salmon in 2012 was on average 3.50 €/kg, which meant a 
35% decrease from the year before. The price has been on average 4.38 €/kg during 
the past seven years. The producer price does not include value added tax, which was 
13% for fish in 2012. The average prices refer to gutted salmon (FGFRI 2013e, 6). 
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Sequential fisheries 
 
Finnish fishermen use trapnets for catching salmon in coastal areas. Salmon from the 
northern Baltic rivers, such as River Tornionjoki, are caught in the Gulf of Bothnia. 
The coastal fishery underwent technological improvements in the late 20th century 
(Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 331), e.g. seal safe trapnets were developed 
(Hemmingsson, Fjälling & Lunneryd 2008, 357). The major part of the catch is caught 
with salmon trapnets, whitefish trapnets and push up trapnets (FGFRI 2013d). The 
trapnet fishery takes place in June and July, when the mature salmon migrate to their 
natal rivers to spawn (Kulmala et al. 2008b, 718). The major part of the catch consists 
of two- (2SW) and three-sea-winter (3SW) salmon with an average weight of 6-7 kg 
(FGFRI 2013b). 
 
In recent years roughly 150 fishermen and 400 trapnets have been engaged in the Gulf 
of Bothnia salmon fishery. This includes the Åland Islands and the Archipelago Sea 
(Pakarinen 2013, personal communication). The fishing effort, expressed in geardays, 
in the past decade is pictured in Figure 8. Effort has been around 18 000 geardays 
annually in recent years. The catch per unit of effort (cpue) has varied on a yearly 
basis in the long run, and a slight growing trend has been detected (FGFRI 2011b, 59). 
In 2012, the coastal trapnet fishery accounted for 83% of the total commercial salmon 
catch in Finland (ICES 2013b, 10). Before 2008, driftnets were also used in the coastal 
fishery, but as of 1 January 2008 the EU has banned all use of driftnets in the Baltic 
Sea (ICES 2012a, 27). 
 
 
Figure 8. The effort of the coastal salmon fishery in the Gulf of Bothnia in the past twelve years. 
Source: data from Pakarinen 2013, personal communication. 
 29 
The driftnet ban affected the offshore salmon fishery as well. After 2008, only 
longlines were used to catch salmon in the Main Basin, which lead to a substantial 
increase in this fishery. Indeed, harvest rates for the longline fishery in 2011 was as 
high as the driftnet and longline harvest rates combined in the early and mid-2000s 
(ICES 2012a, 1). In Finland, the longline harvest rates have been fairly constant in 
recent years, and the share of the total catch has varied a little above and under 15% 
since 2008 (FGFRI 2013d). However, before the driftnet ban, in 2007, the total catch 
share of the longline fishery was only 7% (FGFRI 2008, 26).  
 
In 2012, 19 Finnish vessels still fished salmon with longlines, though only two vessels 
operated down in the Main Basin (ICES 2013b, 10). The Baltic Sea longline fishery is 
concentrated to the most southern part of the Main Basin (FGFRI 2013f). In contrast 
to the trapnet fishery, the longline fishing is carried out during the winter months. In 
theory, longline fishing could be possible in the Bothnian Sea was well, but in practice, 
seals and busy ship traffic prevent fishing in this area (ICES 2012a, 146). As of 2013 
both Finland and Sweden have closed down their offshore longline fisheries (ICES 
2013b, 23-24). Now only Denmark and Poland catch salmon with longlines in the 
Main Basin (Pakarinen 2013, personal communication). 
 
The Baltic Sea river fishery is recreational, in contrast to the commercial marine 
fishery. Angling is the predominant fishing technique (FGFRI 2011b, 66), and in River 
Tornionjoki, specifically, rod fishing by rowing dominates (ICES 2013b, 72). There 
are also recreational fishermen fishing at sea with nets, trapnets and other gear. There 
is no obligation to report recreational catch, so catch estimates are based on different 
survey methods (ICES 2012a, 24).  
 
In the past decades, damming of rivers and high fishing pressure at sea effectively 
restrained the fishing in rivers. In the 1990s, the river fishing started to increase as a 
result of stricter regulation of the offshore and coastal fisheries (FGFRI 2011b, 65). 
The Finnish recreational catch in 2012 was 135 tons, which is almost twice as much as 
in 2011. The main increase was in River Tornionjoki, which recorded its largest catch 
in decades. The catch was over 100 tons; a level that has not been experienced since 
the early 20th century. Also cpue increased markedly, indicating significant increases 
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in spawner abundance (ICES 2013b, 72). Recreational fishing is not considered in the 
analysis of this study. 
 
3.3 Management of the Baltic salmon fishery 
 
A brief history of Baltic salmon management 
 
Acknowledgement of the need for fisheries regulation in order to conserve Baltic 
salmon stocks date back to the late 19th century (Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 332). 
International regulation began taking form in the 1950s and 1960s and was highlighted 
by the ratification of the Baltic Salmon Fisheries Convention in 1966. The articles of 
the convention were adopted by the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission 
(IBSFC), a decision-making organ established in 1976 (Karlsson & Karlström 1994, 
70). During these decades, different regulatory measures were introduced: minimum 
landing, hook and mesh size, and restrictions to the number of fishing gear per boat. 
Also closed seasons were introduced. Many of these management measures are still in 
use. However, the regulations did not seem to work that well, since the Baltic salmon 
stocks decreased almost continually up until the end of the 1980s (Karlsson & 
Karlström 1994, 70; Romakkaniemi et al. 2003, 332). In 1993, TACs were 
implemented for the first time by the IBSFC (ICES 2012a, 141). 
 
In 1997, the IBSFC together with the Helsinki Commission launched the Salmon 
Action Plan (SAP) in order to achieve long-term management goals for Baltic salmon. 
The key issue in the SAP is the protection of wild salmon populations and the 
rebuilding of stocks (Helsinki Commission 2011, 15-16). The wild smolt production 
has increased significantly since the adoption of the SAP (ICES 2013a, 1). The IBSFC 
ceased to exist in 1997, but the SAP was in operation until 2006. Presently, the 
international Baltic salmon management is run by the EU by means of TACs, size 
regulations and closed seasons. National river regulation is carried out according to the 
former SAP. In 2009 the European Commission committed to establishing a new 
management plan for Baltic salmon, but the plan has not yet been accepted. The new 
plan proposes that the TAC be set according to a constant fishing mortality rate of 0.1 
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in marine fisheries (European Commission 2013b; STECF 2012a, 22; ICES 2013a, 2). 
Next, I will go through the present international and Finnish management measures. 
 
Current management measures 
 
The annual TAC quota is allocated by the European Commission between the Baltic 
Sea countries. There are two management areas: the Gulf of Bothnia and the Main 
Basin constitute one, the Gulf of Finland another (ICES 2012a, 141). The 
Commission’s decisions are based on scientific advice provided by ICES. However, 
these are only recommendations, and in recent years the quotas set at the political level 
have been considerably higher than those suggested by the scientists (see e.g. FGFRI 
2011b, 7). Nevertheless, the TAC of Baltic salmon has been reduced several times in 
the past years. For 2013, the Commission proposed a TAC of 108 762 salmon for the 
Gulf of Bothnia and the Main Basin. The TAC for 2014 will be slightly smaller with 
around 106 000 salmon (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 2013). 
 
The annual catches have in the past been below the catch quotas, which means the 
TAC has not in effect regulated the salmon fishery. In 2012, however, Finland actually 
exceeded its quota of that year (32 000 salmon), which was made possible by a quota 
swapping with Latvia (ICES 2013b, 11) Additionally, in March 2012 the offshore 
fisheries of Finland and Sweden fulfilled their share of the national quotas, and were 
therefore closed down. Also in the early and mid-1990s the quotas decreased offshore 
fishing, thus contributing to the recovery of northern Baltic salmon stocks (ICES 
2012a, 146). 
 
The minimum landing size of Baltic salmon is 60 cm. An exception is the Bothnian 
Bay fishery, where the minimum size has been decreased to 50 cm. The minimum 
landing size is important in the offshore fishery. This was especially true after the 
driftnet ban, since the longline fishery does not have the same size selectivity as 
driftnets. However, size regulation does not play an important role in the coastal 
fishery, because the majority of spawners are 60-90 cm long. As a matter of fact, the 
result of this regulation is that the least valuable part of the stock, i.e. the smallest 
salmon, is left unexploited. (ICES 2012a, 146.) 
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There is a summer closure of the salmon fishery in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Main 
Basin from 1 June to 15 September. This closure does not concern the trapnet fishery 
(ICES 2012a, 141). However, there are national restrictions on the coastal fishery, in 
order to save a proportion of the spawning migrators from the coastal harvest. Finland 
has set time restrictions on the salmon fishery in its economic zone in the Gulf of 
Bothnia. The closure begins 1 April and ends depending on the zone as follows: 16 
June in the Bothnian Sea, 21 June in the Quark, 26 June in the southern Bothnian Bay 
and 1 July in the northern Bothnian Bay. However, professional fishermen may start 
fishing one week earlier with two trapnets. Three weeks after the opening of the 
fishery five trapnets per fisherman is allowed. After this, for another three weeks, eight 
trapnets per fisherman is allowed (ICES 2012a, 143&147). 
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4 Analysis 
 
This is the main chapter of the thesis, where I seek to find answers to the research 
questions set up for this study. I will begin by introducing the fuel cost scenarios that 
represent different approaches to incorporating the fuel use externality into the costs of 
fisheries. Next, the bioeconomic model used for the optimization and numerical 
analysis is introduced, with some extensions and elaborations placed in the 
appendices. Finally, in the last section, all results of the study are presented. 
 
4.1 Fuel cost scenarios 
 
The number one aim of this thesis is to investigate the consequences of removing fuel 
tax concessions to the coastal salmon fisheries in Finland. The underlying idea here is 
that the fishery would pay for the external costs caused by CO2 emissions from its 
direct fishing activities. The theory behind environmental and climate policy was 
discussed in chapter 2. Here I will present some hypothetical scenarios, through which 
such policies could be implemented. These are scenarios put forward in the research 
project that this study is part of. The scenarios used in the analysis are labeled as 
current situation, Baseline, EU, Stern and National, and are again exhibited in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Fuel cost scenarios. 
 
Scenario  Definition 
0. Current situation - 
1. Baseline  Fuel use exempt from costs  
2. EU EU CO2 quota price in 2009 
3. Stern Social cost of CO2 
4. National  Finnish fuel tax in 2009 
 
 
The current situation is not a scenario per se, but is a representation of the fishery 
under current management, i.e. the fishery is not optimized. Baseline is the first actual 
scenario, since the fishery is optimized, although the fuel tax concessions are left in 
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place. The three scenarios, where an additional cost is imposed on fuel use in fisheries 
are discussed below. 
  
The EU scenario 
 
This scenario represents a situation where fuel tax concessions for fisheries within the 
EU would be abolished. In this scenario the fishery is assumed to operate within an 
emissions trading system, and specifically the EU ETS. This means that the fishing 
enterprises are obligated to buy CO2 quotas that correspond to the amount of 
emissions they emit. Prices for emission allowances are obtained from the European 
Energy Exchange (EEX), which is a leading market place in Europe for energy and 
related products, such as power, natural gas, coal and CO2 emission rights. The base 
year, as decided within the research project, is 2009. For this year the average quota 
price was €13.03 per ton CO2 (EEX 2013). 
 
The price per ton CO2 has fluctuated quite a lot since the launch of the EU ETS. 
Starting at around €5, the price quickly rose and remained at €20-30 for about a year. 
When it became clear that the initial allocation had been too large, the price crashed. 
After a short recovery, the price began a decline that finally hit zero by mid-2007 
(Hintermann 2010, 43). Since then the price has risen somewhat again. However, the 
current price is considerably lower than what it was in 2009. The last couple of years 
the price has been approximately within the range of €4-8 per ton CO2 (EEX 2013).  
 
The Stern scenario 
 
The Stern scenario represents a situation where a cost for CO2 emissions is imposed 
on the fishing sector on the global level. The scenario gets its name from the well-
known “Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change”, issued by economist 
Nicholas Stern and his team for the British government in 2006. The Review by Stern 
(2006) examines the economic impact of climate change, and considers the different 
policy measures available for carrying out a transition to a low-carbon economy. The 
Stern Review has an international perspective and emphasizes the need of 
international actions against the global threats of climate change. 
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The report stresses the need to put a price on carbon through taxation, emissions 
trading or regulation. In this scenario the external cost from fuel use in fisheries is 
internalized by a global CO2 tax. The fuel tax is based on the estimated social cost of 
CO2 today if the world remains on a business-as-usual (BAU) trajectory. The social 
cost describes how much the damage one ton of CO2 is worth to society. BAU means 
that measures are not taken to mitigate climate change and that emission levels 
therefore remain as before.  The cost proposed in the Stern Review is $85 per ton CO2, 
which is higher than what had previously been suggested in the literature. The cost is 
also significantly different from the cost used in the EU scenario, which is beneficial 
for the analysis. Using the yearly average exchange rate from USD to EUR in 2009 
(European Central Bank 2013), the cost €60.93 per ton CO2 is obtained. 
 
The National scenario  
 
This is a scenario where the fuel used by the fishing sector is taxed according to 
Finnish legislation. As a member of the EU, Finland is bound by the Energy Taxation 
Directive from 20044. This directive defines the energy products and lays down the 
minimum fuel taxation levels in the Member States (Finnish Customs 2013a, 1). 
 
Excise duty is collected according to the Act on Excise Duty on Liquid Fuels from 
1994. The taxation is carried out and controlled by the Finnish Customs. Taxable fuels 
are for example motor gasoline, small engine gasoline, diesel oil and light and heavy 
fuel oil. As of January 2011, the taxation of fuel is carried out through taxation of fuel 
components. These components are energy content tax and CO2 tax, which consider 
the fuel’s energy content and CO2 emissions respectively (Ministry of Finance 2012; 
Finnish Customs 2013a, 1&3&6). In the case of motor gasoline and diesel oil, as well 
as their bio-based substitutes, the CO2 tax is calculated based on the CO2 equivalent 
emissions that arise during the fuel’s life cycle. Thus, the tax on these fuels is graded 
                                                               
4
 In April 2011 the European Commission presented its proposal for a renewal of the rules on taxation 
of energy products in the EU. The new way of taxation takes into account both CO2 emissions and 
energy content of energy products. This revision supports the Commission’s ambition to promote 
energy efficiency and consumption of more environmentally friendly products (European Commission 
2013c). 
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according to the fuel’s environmental impact. This is the ruling as of 1 June 2012 
(Finlex 1472/1994; Ministry of Finance 2012).  
 
Table 4 shows current excise duty rates as cents per liter of fuel for fuels used by 
Finnish fishing vessels. There is also a strategic stockpile fee that is carried out on 
liquid fuels and other energy products. This fee is meant to cover the government’s 
expenses caused by emergency stockpiling and other measures carried out to secure 
energy supplies (Finnish Customs 2013a, 1). 
 
Table 4. Excise duty rates on fuels used by fishing vessels, as of 1 January 2013. 
Source: Finnish Customs 2013a, 2. 
Product  
 
Energy 
content tax 
Carbon 
dioxide tax 
Strategic 
stockpile fee 
Total 
Motor gasoline c/l 50.36 14.00 0.68 65.04 
Diesel oil c/l 30.70 15.90 0.35 46.95 
Light fuel oil c/l 9.30 9.34 0.35 18.99 
 
 
Again, as in the EU scenario, I will here use data from 2009 in accordance with what 
was decided within the research project. In 2009, before the energy tax reform, the 
fuel tax in Finland consisted of basic duty and additional duty as well as a stockpile 
fee (Ministry of Finance 2009, 129). However, the basic and additional duty can here 
be thought of in terms of an energy and CO2 tax. In the analysis I assume that the 
fishery uses motor gasoline (see Appendix B). In Table 5 are exhibited the different 
components and total amount of the excise duty for motor gasoline in 2009. 
 
Table 5. Excise duty rate on motor gasoline in 2009. 
Source: Ministry of Finance 2009, 129. 
Fuel  
 
Basic duty Additional 
duty 
Strategic 
stockpile fee 
Total 
Motor gasoline c/l 57.24 4.78 0.68 62.70 
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Summary of fuel costs 
 
I now know the size of the fuel cost in the National scenario. In the calculations the 
national tax exemption is based on the excise duty in 2009, which amounted to 62.70 
cents per liter of gasoline (Ministry of Finance 2009, 129), or €620.70 per 1000 liter 
(m3) gasoline. Next, I must calculate this cost for the EU and Stern scenarios as well. 
To do this, I need to know how much CO2 emissions are produced from the 
combustion of motor gasoline. The number used here is 2.33 kg CO2 per liter of 
gasoline (Biomass Energy Centre 2013). When multiplying this with the cost per ton 
CO2 introduced in respective scenario, the cost of CO2 in 1000 liter of gasoline is 
obtained (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6. CO2 and gasoline costs in 2009. 
 
Scenario €/ton CO2 €/m
3
 fuel 
National   627.0 
Basic duty  572.4 
Additional duty  47.8 
Stockpile fee  6.8 
EU 13.03  30.36   
Stern 60.93  141.96  
 
 
Finally, in Table 7 are the actual fuel prices paid by the fishermen in the different 
scenarios. The price for gasoline (98 octane) used here is €1.322 per liter, which is an 
average of the consumer price in 2009 (Maskula 2013, personal communication). This 
means that the price contains the full value of the excise tax, i.e. no tax concessions 
exist. Thus, this is the price paid by the fishermen in the National scenario. To obtain 
the price for the current situation and the Baseline, the amount of the excise duty (see 
Table 5) is subtracted from the National fuel price. In the EU and Stern scenarios the 
CO2 costs amount to 3.036 cents and 14.196 cents per liter of gasoline, respectively. 
To obtain the fuel price for these scenarios, the aforementioned costs are added to the 
Baseline fuel price. 
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Table 7. The price per liter of gasoline paid by the fishermen in the different scenarios. 
 
Scenario  €/liter 
0. Current situation 
1. Baseline 
 0.70 
0.70 
2. EU  0.73 
3. Stern  0.84 
4. National  1.32 
 
 
4.2 Bioeconomic model 
 
In this section I will present the bioeconomic model used in the optimization of the 
salmon fishery. Both the biological and economic part of the model and the links 
between them are discussed. If necessary, the reader is advised to revisit chapter 3, 
where background information on several issues addressed in this section can be 
found. 
 
4.2.1 Population model 
 
The fish stock is the natural capital of the fishery. The size of the stock is affected by 
the recruitment of new individuals and the growth of existing individuals, as well as 
natural and fishing mortality. In the basic Schaefer model (see e.g. Figure 3) the stock 
is measured in terms of biomass, and the net effects of recruitment, growth and natural 
mortality are depicted in one simple equation. Although useful for analytical and 
pedagogical purposes, such biomass models are often too simplistic for describing real 
life fisheries. A more realistic view of fish population dynamics can be obtained with 
age-structured models that treat recruitment, individual growth and natural mortality 
independently (Anderson & Seijo 2010, 11&73). Even though accounting for the 
different age-classes adds considerable complexity to the modeling, such addition of 
biological realism is warranted in the economic research of fisheries. For example, 
Tahvonen (2008, 547) claims that not only will age-structured models bring new 
insights to the field of optimal harvesting studies, but also increase the contribution of 
economics in practical resource management. 
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In this study I apply a discrete age-structured population model that was presented by 
Michielsens et al. (2006), and is used by ICES WGBAST. ICES uses this model in its 
salmon stock assessment and as a basis for the management recommendations it 
provides. The model was adopted by Kulmala et al. (2008a, 2008b, 2013) in order to 
bring forth a biologically realistic bioeconomic model that could be applied to Baltic 
salmon management. The population model forms the constraint in the economic 
optimization of fishery. 
 
An age-structured population model considers the life cycle of salmon and thus allows 
for an analysis of economically significant age groups, i.e. age groups that are 
harvested by fisheries. The model is calibrated with data for the River Tornionjoki 
wild salmon stock. The stock data originates from the 2010 report by ICES WGBAST.  
 
The initial population size and age-specific parameters are gathered in Table 8a. The 
age groups considered are egg, alevin, fry, parr, smolt and 1SW-5SW mature salmon. 
Homing rate is the proportion of each age class that begins its spawning migration. 
Sex ratio is the proportion of fecund females in each age class, i.e. females that are 
able to produce offspring. Fecundity is the age-specific number of eggs produced per 
female. The catchability coefficient describes the fishery’s efficiency to catch salmon, 
which in the case of trapnets is assumed to differ depending on the age group 
(Michielsens et al. 2006, 328). As such, the catchability coefficient represents the 
fishing technology that is used to harvest the fish (Anderson & Seijo 2010, 18). 
 
Table 8a. Initial population size and age-specific biological parameters. 
Age group 
a=1,2,…,10 
Initial population 
(𝒏𝒂 ,𝟏) 
Homing 
rate (hr) 
Sex ratio 
(sr) 
Fecundity  
(fe) 
Catchability 
coefficient (q) 
Egg 175600000 0 0 0 0 
Alevin 175600000 0 0 0 0 
Fry 175600000 0 0 0 0 
Parr 175600000 0 0 0 0 
Smolt 1192500 0 0 0 0 
1SW 107100 0.15735 0.02 7070 0.000018 
2SW 59730 0.31855 0.5 9998 0.000018 
3SW 22375 0.5203 0.5 13590 0.000017 
4SW 5774 0.5016 0.5 20000 0.000017 
5SW 2341 1 0.5 26750 0.000017 
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Table 8b exhibits the parameters that are constant and do not vary between the age 
classes. The recruitment parameters are used to describe the recruitment of new 
individuals (see Appendix A), which is one of the most important and difficult 
estimation tasks when making fish stock projections (Anderson & Seijo 2010, 81). To 
account for natural mortality among the salmon the model contains values for survival 
in the post-smolt and adult stages, as well as a value for M74 survival. For a more 
detailed description of the population dynamics, see Appendix A. 
 
Table 8b. Constant biological parameters. 
 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Recruitment parameter α 51.57 
Recruitment parameter β 0.000496 
Post-smolt survival ps 0.0841 
Adult natural survival s 0.9307 
M74 survival m74 0.94 
  
 
4.2.2 Economic model 
 
If the fish stock is the fishery’s natural capital, then the fishing fleet is the man-made 
capital of the system. The purpose of the fleet is to make profit by harvesting the stock 
and providing fish for the market. Central components of the economic model are the 
costs of inputs, the price of fish, and the relationship between fishing effort and 
harvest, which is described by the production function. Fishing effort and fleet size 
tend to vary with the net returns obtained from the fishery, in such a way that greater 
profits increase effort and fleet size, and vice versa. This is particularly the case in an 
unregulated open access fishery. One of the key purposes of bioeconomic modeling is, 
given biological and economic realities, to propose a desired level of fishing effort. 
(Anderson & Seijo 2010, 11-12.) 
 
The economically efficient use of a fishery over time is an optimal control problem. 
The fish stock is the state variable that has the potential to produce a flow of benefits 
through time. Fishing effort is the control variable with which a social planner can 
adjust the state variable, given the population dynamics of the stock. Over time, the 
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size of the fish stock is affected by both natural and fishing mortality, which will 
determine to what extent revenues can be earned from the fishery in the future. The 
social planner’s task is thus to control the state variable through changes in effort in a 
way that will maximize the net present value of the fishery. (Anderson & Seijo 2010, 
51&59.) 
 
The economic realities of the Baltic salmon trapnet fishery are presented in Table 9, 
which exhibits the economic parameters utilized in the model. Mean cost per unit of 
effort is the average scenario-specific unit cost of fishing. Fishing effort is measured 
in geardays, which is calculated by multiplying the number of fishing days by the 
number of gear (trapnets). The cost parameter is defined as € per trapnet day. Four 
different unit costs are utilized in the analysis, one for each fuel cost scenario: 
Baseline, EU, Stern and National. The fishing costs have been estimated by 
interviewing Finnish fishermen that participate in the Gulf of Bothnia salmon fishery. 
The variable costs considered are gear price, gear maintenance, vessel maintenance 
and labor and fuel costs. Taking into account these expenses I have calculated the cost 
of fishing with one trapnet for one day. For a more detailed description of the cost 
estimation procedure, see Appendix B. 
 
Age-specific catch price has been calculated based on average producer prices over a 
period of ten years. This price information is available in the annual statistical 
publication “Producer Prices for Fish”, issued by FGFRI. Because the model is 
calibrated with data for the River Tornionjoki stock, a parameter is needed to ensure 
that the effort in the model is targeted to this specific stock. ICES (2010, 42) provides 
estimates on the proportion of individual river stocks in the Atlantic salmon catches 
from the Baltic Sea. Median offshore longline survival describes the proportion of 
salmon that is not harvested in the Main Basin and is therefore potential catch for the 
coastal trapnet fisheries. The estimate 0.77 is used by Holma et al. (2013, 6). The 
parameter for gutted fish proportion implies that 75% of the fish is left after gutting, 
which is an estimate also used by Holma et al. (2013, 11) and is taken from a study by 
FGFRI (2007, 9). 
 
Because I am interested in the long-run value of the salmon fishery, a discount rate 
needs to be considered when calculating the net present value. In order to obtain a 
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NPV, all future benefits and costs need to discounted, i.e. given a present value. The 
discount rate used here is 5%, which is in accordance with other studies on optimal 
resource management (Kulmala et al. 2008b, 721). 
 
Table 9. Economic parameters. 
 
Parameter Symbol   Value 
 
Mean cost per unit of effort
a
 
(€/gearday) 
𝑐𝐵  
𝑐𝐸  
𝑐𝑆 
𝑐𝑁  
47.55 
47.71 
48.29 
50.83 
 
Age-specific catch price
b 
(€/fish) 
𝑝𝑎   10.6; 26.4; 41.2; 41.6; 48.5 
Proportion of River 
Tornionjoki salmon 
j 0.3 
Median offshore longline 
survival 
oll 0.77 
Gutted fish proportion
c
 g 0.75 
Discount rate
 
r 0.05 
a 
Subindexes B, E, S and N denote the different scenarios. 
b 
The catch price is for gutted fish. 
c 
This parameter describes the proportion of fish that is left after gutting.  
 
 
The control variable in the optimization problem is fishing effort E. I am seeking the 
level of effort that will maximize the discounted net benefits from the salmon stock 
over time, given variations in fishing cost due to different fuel cost policies. The 
timespan used in the model run is 50 years. The solution to the optimization problem 
is obtained through numerical analysis. I apply open-loop optimization, where the 
control variable is fixed in the first period and is therefore constant. The state variable 
(stock size) and harvest are constraints and are defined dynamically through time. 
Thus, the model can be defined as a semi-dynamic bioeconomic model. The 
optimization and numerical analysis is executed in Matlab, using the fmincon toolbox, 
which is an optimization algorithm. 
 
Below, two fundamental equations of the economic model are presented, namely the 
harvest and objective functions. The harvest function (4.1) gives the number of fish 
harvested at time t 
 
 ( )    𝑎 ( )(   
   𝐸) ,    (4.1) 
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where hr is age-specific homing rate, N the amount of fishable salmons at time t and  
(      𝐸) the harvest rate. How N is defined over time is explained in Appendix A. 
The harvest rate specifies the fishing mortality depending on the age of the fish by 
multiplying the age-specific catchability coefficient with the fishing effort. 
 
The purpose of the objective function (4.2) is to calculate the net present value of the 
salmon fishery over the 50 year time period. The revenue to the trapnet fishery is 
defined as 𝑝𝑎 ( )𝑎, i.e. age-specific catch price times harvest. Cost is defined as 
scenario-specific cost times fishing effort: 𝑐   . When subtracting costs from 
revenues and taking into account the discount rate, the profit function that gives the 
total net economic benefit for the salmon fishery can be written as follows 
 
 ( )  ∑ 𝑝𝑎 ( )𝑎  (𝑐  
  
   
  )  (   )                                                   (   ) 
     
where scenario-specific cost 𝑐   𝑐𝐵 , 𝑐𝐸, 𝑐𝑆, 𝑐𝑁  . g is the parameter for gutted fish, j is 
the River Tornionjoki stock parameter and (   )    is the discount factor. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
In this last section of chapter 4, the results from the analysis are compiled. Here are 
results both from the bioeconomic analysis as well as estimations of the current 
situation of the fishery. Hence, it is important to realize when the fishery is optimized 
and when it is described in the light of present management. For a reminder of what is 
intended by fisheries management and climate change management, see chapter 1 and 
2. Keeping these issues in mind, comparisons between the following situations of the 
fishery are made 
 
1. fishery under present management vs. fishery under optimal management, and 
 
2. current fishery under climate change management vs. optimal fishery under 
climate change management. 
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4.3.1 Current fisheries 
 
First up is the description of the current fishery. This is done in two ways, namely by 
looking at the whole Gulf of Bothnia fishery and by looking at only the River 
Tornionjoki stock. Keep in mind that the Tornionjoki stock comprises about one third 
of the Gulf of Bothnia fishery5. At this point I will only examine the fishery in the 
Gulf of Bothnia. Later, when optimizing the fishery, the target of interest will be the 
Tornionjoki stock. Table 10 shows economic, fleet and fuel data for the Gulf of 
Bothnia fishery. Fleet data is obtained from FGFRI (Pakarinen 2013, personal 
communication). Economic and fuel data is based on my calculations and estimations, 
which I will elaborate on next. 
 
The total Finnish commercial salmon catch in 2010 was 215 tons and the landed value 
amounted to €922 000 (FGFRI 2011c, 12). From this, one can calculate the value per 
landed kg to be €4.3. Multiplying this with the catch in the Gulf of Bothnia results in a 
landings income of €609 000. The total cost is obtained by multiplying the unit cost of 
fishing (see Table 9 and Appendix B) with the number of trapnet days. The fishery’s 
net profit is the difference between landings income and total costs. As can be seen, 
the salmon fishery is currently unprofitable, with a yearly net loss of €216 000. The 
fuel subsidy is taken into account in this result, i.e. tax concessions remain in place. 
 
Last, I estimated accumulated fuel use based on my interviews with the fishermen. 
The average yearly consumption (1600 liters) is multiplied with the number of fishers, 
and thus a consumption of 240 m3 of fuel per annum is obtained. CO2 emissions are 
calculated by multiplying the fuel consumption with 2.33 kg CO2/liter gasoline (see 
p.37). From this the fuel efficiency indicators kg catch/liter and landings value/liter 
can then be derived. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               
5
 The coefficent used here is 0.3 (see Table 9). 
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Table 10. Physical and economic data for the Finnish salmon fishery in the Gulf of Bothnia, 2010. 
 
Indicator  Value 
Fleet 
Number of fishers/vessels  
Number of gear 
Effort (trapnet days) 
Days at sea 
Harvest (1000 kg) 
Harvest (nr. of fish) 
  
149 
448 
17 342 
39 
142 
23 028 
Economic data (€1000)   
Income 
Landings income  
  
609 
Costs 
Fuel 
Labor 
Other variable costs 
 825 
63 (7.6%) 
186 (22.6%) 
576 (69.8%) 
Net profit  -216
a 
Fuel   
Cubic meters (m
3
)  240 
CO2 emissions (tons)  559 
Kg catch/liter  0.59 
Landings value (€)/liter  2.54 
a 
Excluding non-fuel subsidies. 
 
 
Here follows some notes regarding the validity of the estimated economic indicators. 
Because the Finnish salmon fishery does not constitute a fleet segment of its own, data 
on expenditures is not easily available. This is why I have estimated the costs myself. 
The salmon fishery belongs to the fleet segment: vessels <10m using passive gear. 
This segment has been unprofitable, with poor economic results. This is most 
probably caused by a high cost structure compared to fish market prices. Although a 
direct parallel cannot be drawn between the whole segment and the salmon fishery, a 
relation between the two is discernible. In 2010, this segment reported losses of about 
€2.7 million. The segment consists of approximately 1500 vessels, and had a landings 
value of €8.1 million in 2010 (STECF 2012b, 140). Considering that I do not account 
for the trapnet fishery in the Gulf of Finland6, it seems that the salmon fishery in total 
makes up for about one tenth of this fleet segment. As seen above, the Gulf of Bothnia 
fishery accounts for 150 vessels, €609 000 in landings value and €216 000 in losses. 
                                                               
6
 The catch in the Gulf of Finland in 2010 was 34 000 kg, with a landed value of €146 000 (FGFRI 
2011c). 
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This provides confirmation that the cost estimations used in the profitability 
calculations here are feasible. 
The next set of results is presented in Table 11 below. This shows the effects on 
profitability of the fishery from introducing fuel cost policies in the current situation. 
This means that everything remains as before, except that fuel costs increase as a 
result of climate change management. The added cost is obtained by multiplying the 
€/m3 fuel (see Table 6) with the amount of fuel consumed, which is here assumed to 
be 240 m3 in all scenarios. When adding an additional cost to the already unprofitable 
fishery, the net loss only increases. Naturally, the high tax in the National scenario has 
the largest impact, whereas the effect of the other fuel cost policies is less significant. 
In the National scenario the fuel tax implies an 18% increase in costs, and to a 
subsequent 69% increase in loss. 
 
Table 11. Economic effects from introducing fuel cost policies in the current situation  in the Gulf of 
Bothnia salmon fishery, 2010. 
 
Indicator                                                               Current management 
 1. Baseline 2. EU 3. Stern 4. National 
Fuel     
Cubic meters 
(m
3
) 
240 240 240 240 
Added cost 
(€1000 ) 
0 7 34 150 
 
Economic data 
(€1000 ) 
    
Landings value 609 609 609 609 
Costs 825 832 859 975 
Net profit -216 -223 -259 -366 
 
 
4.3.2 Optimal fisheries 
 
Next, the aim is to compare the optimized and current fishery, and further to examine 
the effects of climate change management, as represented by the different fuel cost 
scenarios. Table 12 shows the effects of the different fuel cost policies on selected 
indicators under optimal fisheries management. These effects are to be compared to 
the current situation, which is depicted on the left hand side of the table. Key 
indicators that are studied are effort, net present value and CO2 emissions. All 
 47 
indicators and changes in them when moving from current to optimal fisheries 
management and as result of climate policy are presented in Table 12. The 
optimization results apply to the River Tornionjoki stock fishery. Also the current 
situation is here represented by data for this specific stock, thus fishing effort is 
approximately one third of that in the whole Gulf of Bothnia. The current effort level 
used here is the mean yearly effort during the period 2000-20107 (data from Pakarinen 
2013, personal communication). In order to obtain a comparable figure for 
profitability in the current situation, the bioeconomic model is run with the present 
effort, and thus an approximation for current NPV is obtained. 
 
Table 12. Long run effects in scenarios 1-4 from fuel cost policies on net present value, fishing effort, 
fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. River Tornionjoki stock, 2010. 
 
Indicator                                                                             Optimal management 
 0. Current 
situation 
1. Baseline 2. EU 3. Stern 4. National 
Fleet      
Effort (trapnet 
days) 
6858 3312 
(-52%) 
3190 
(-4%) 
2751 
(-17%) 
857 
(-74%) 
Number of 
fishers/vessels 
 
59 
 
 
29 
 
28 
 
24 
 
7 
Economic data 
(€1000 ) 
     
Net present value -5 42 
 
39 
(-7%) 
29 
(-30%) 
3 
(-93%) 
Fuel      
Cubic meters (m
3
) 95 46 44 38 12 
CO2 emissions 
(tons) 
221 
 
106 
(-52%) 
103 
(-3%) 
88 
(-17%) 
28 
(-74%) 
Kg catch/liter 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 
Landing value 
(€)/liter 
1.31 1.40 1.40 1.41 1.46 
Other      
Harvest (nr. of 
fish) 
4674 2411 2328 2023 652 
Harvest (1000 kg) 28.84 14.88 14.36 12.48 4.02 
Stock size (1000 
fish) 
 
155 
 
161 
 
161 
 
161 
 
164 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               
7
 22861*0.3=6858 geardays. 
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Effects on effort, fleet and employment 
 
A movement to optimal fisheries management will have implications for the amount 
of effort allowed, which might subsequently have an impact on fleet size and 
employment. The effects on number of fishers and vessels are shown in Table 12. 
Maximizing NPV would imply a 52% decrease in effort from the current level. If on 
top of this fuel cost policies were introduced, there would be further decrease in effort, 
but of various extents. The impact of the EU and Stern policies is quite moderate in 
comparison: only 4% and 17% decrease from the Baseline, respectively. On the other 
hand, it seems that the fuel tax in the National scenario would cut effort by up to 74% 
compared to the Baseline scenario. These relative effects on effort from the different 
management measures are depicted in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Impact on effort from optimizing the fishery (a) and from implementing fuel cost policies (b). 
 
In order to provide compatible results for our research project, I have also estimated 
effects on fleet size and employment. Employment, which is known (see Table 10), is 
simultaneously a good estimate for fleet size, since the typical small-scale coastal 
fishing enterprise usually consists of one fisherman (Pakarinen 2013, personal 
communication). However, the changes in number of fishers/vessels are estimated 
based on the changes in effort, and must therefore be taken with reservation. Knowing 
that 149 vessels share among them 17342 geardays (see Table 10), I have assumed 
that one vessel stands for 116 geardays. Given the amount of effort, a corresponding 
number of vessels is then derived from this. 
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Economic effects 
 
The net present value gives the value of the fishery over the 50-year timespan. As can 
be seen from Table 12, the current fishery has a negative NPV of €5000. This is in line 
with the results I obtained from the profitability calculations with respect to the Gulf 
of Bothnia fishery. However, given that the River Tornionjoki stock comprises about 
one third of the Gulf of Bothnia fishery, this loss seems quite moderate in comparison. 
Looking at the fuel cost scenarios 1-4, the model suggests that by moving to optimal 
management the fishery could be made slightly profitable. The profit is €42 000 when 
maximizing NPV in the Baseline scenario. As for the remaining fuel cost scenarios, 
the result is similar to what it was in the case of effort. The effects of the EU and Stern 
policies are small compared to the effect from moving from the current situation to the 
Baseline. Again, the National scenario has a more significant impact on profits than 
the other policies. Nonetheless, the NPV stays positive in all fuel cost scenarios when 
optimizing the fishery. The effects on profitability discussed above are illustrated in 
Figure 10 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Impact on profitability from optimizing the fishery (a) and from fuel cost policies (b). 
 
Fuel consumption and CO2 emissions 
 
The fuel consumption and subsequent CO2 emissions are estimated based on effort. 
Given that 17342 geardays of effort is fueled by 240 m3 of gasoline (see Table 10), I 
make the assumption that approximately 14 liters of fuel is consumed per gearday. The 
nature of the changes in both of these indicators as a result of the different 
management measures is the same as with the previously discussed indicators. There 
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is a significant decrease in fuel consumption and CO2 emissions from a movement to 
optimal management. The EU and Stern scenarios cause decreases of a lesser 
magnitude, whereas the impact of the National scenario is more significant. The 
percentage changes in CO2 emissions and fuel consumption are the same, since the 
emissions are obtained by multiplying the consumption with the constant 2.33 kg 
CO2/liter fuel. The relative changes in CO2 emissions, shown in Figure 11, resemble 
those shown for effort, since the emissions are contingent on the amount of effort. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Reduction in CO2 emissions from fisheries management (a) and climate change management 
(b). 
 
Table 12 also includes two indicators relating to fuel efficiency. These indicators 
describe how much output the fishery can produce per a given amount of fuel. The 
fuel efficiency indicators originate from the research project, and are kg catch/liter and 
landing value/liter. The landing value is calculated by multiplying the catch in kg with 
€4.3 (see p.44). When maximizing NPV, both kg catch/liter and landing value/liter 
increase. There occurs additional increase in these indicators when introducing the 
fuel cost in the National scenario. In the EU scenario, which has the lowest fuel cost, 
there is no movement in these indicators compared to the Baseline. With the slightly 
higher Stern cost, kg/catch is again equal to the Baseline, whereas landing value/liter 
moves a fraction up. 
 
 
Finally, Table 12 shows indicators, which besides effort and NPV are direct outputs of 
the bioeconomic model. These indicators are harvest level and stock size at which the 
fishery stabilizes in the long run. With the harvest levels, there is again a notable 
change from the current situation to the optimal. The effect of the EU and Stern 
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scenarios is small, whereas in the National scenario a clear impact is discernible. In 
the case of stock size, there is no difference between the EU and Stern scenarios and 
the Baseline. In the National scenario, the very modest level of harvest is explained by 
the low fishing effort. 
 
4.3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
I conclude the analysis by conducting a sensitivity analysis in order to assess the 
impact on key model outputs from changes in some of the important input variables. 
The output indicators observed here are effort, NPV and CO2 emissions. Changes are 
made in fishing cost, catch price, offshore longline survival and post-smolt survival. 
These variables represent central economic and biological inputs in the bioeconomic 
model. The results from the sensitivity analysis are exhibited in Table 13, along with 
data for the current situation and Baseline as points of reference. 
 
Table 13. Current situation, optimal policy (Baseline) and sensitivity analysis. 
 
                           Current situation                                                             Baseline 
 
Effort 
(trapnet days) 
NPV 
(€1000) 
CO2 emissions 
(tons) 
Effort 
(trapnet days) 
NPV 
(€1000) 
CO2 emissions 
(tons) 
6858 -5 221 3312 42 106 
                             25%  increase in                                                        25%  decrease in 
                                fishing costs                                                               fishing costs  
 
Effort 
(trapnet days) 
NPV 
(€1000) 
CO2 emissions 
(tons) 
Effort 
(trapnet days) 
NPV 
(€1000) 
CO2 emissions 
(tons) 
0 
 
0 0 12178 520 392 
                             25%  increase in                                                        25%  decrease in 
                                 catch price                                                                 catch price 
 
Effort 
(trapnet days) 
NPV 
(€1000) 
CO2 emissions 
(tons) 
Effort 
(trapnet days) 
NPV 
(€1000) 
CO2 emissions 
(tons) 
10979 
 
533 353 0 0 0 
                            10%  increase in                                                          5%  decrease in 
                              OLL survival                                                         post-smolt survival                                                         
                                                                                                     
Effort 
(trapnet days) 
NPV 
(€1000) 
CO2 emissions 
(tons) 
Effort 
(trapnet days) 
NPV 
(€1000) 
CO2 emissions 
(tons) 
11381 535 366 
 
1305 6 42 
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From the results of the sensitivity analysis it becomes clear that the present fishing 
costs are very high. A 25% increase in costs renders the fishery unprofitable. A further 
sensitivity analysis revealed that the NPV is zero when the unit cost of fishing is €52 
or above. Correspondingly, a decrease in costs significantly improves profitability and 
raises the optimal effort level as well as fuel use and CO2 emissions. However, a 25% 
decrease in costs would imply a unit cost of €35.66/gearday, which is below the 
lowest of the costs I obtained based on the interviews with fishermen (see Appendix 
B). A unit cost this low therefore seems quite unlikely. Figure 12 illustrates the 
relationship between fishing costs and NPV of the fishery, from which it becomes 
clear how high the fishing costs are presently. 
 
 
Figure 12. The relationship between fishing cost and net present value of the fishery. 
 
Offshore longline survival also seems to have quite a big impact on optimal effort and 
profitability. A 10% increase in this parameter means that less salmon is fished by the 
offshore fleet in the southern Baltic Sea, and more salmon is available for the coastal 
trapnet fisheries. Some increase in this parameter might be realistic, because Finland 
and Sweden have closed down their offshore fisheries since 2010, the year from which 
the model data originates. Finally, I have tested the impact of a decrease in post-smolt 
survival. This is an important biological parameter in the analysis, because post-smolt 
mortality is the most significant factor affecting salmon stock size after reproduction 
(e.g. Kulmala et al. 2008b, 725). Only a 5% decrease in post-smolt survival has a large 
impact, and significantly lowers profitability of the fishery. 
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5 Conclusions  
 
Growing use of fossil fuels and its connection to global warming and climate change 
are continually pivotal topics on the world agenda. These climate issues have not 
traditionally been linked to the environmental impact of fisheries. However, fuel use 
and resulting greenhouse gas emissions are important factors affecting both 
environmental and economic sustainability of fisheries (Driscoll & Tyedmers 2010, 
353). World fisheries are completely dependent on fossil fuels for fishing operations 
that provide livelihood to tens of millions of people and food to billions of people 
around the globe (FAO 2012, 5&10).  
 
Global fisheries are subsidized substantially by national governments, and the 
proportion of support that is given in the form fuel subsidies is significant (Sumaila et 
al. 2006, 47; Sumaila 2013, 251). Following the global attention that has recently been 
directed at fuel tax concessions in the fishing sector (see e.g. Martini 2012), a study on 
the impact of fuel tax concessions removal in Nordic fisheries has been conducted. 
This thesis represents the Finnish case study within this research project. I will here 
sum up the results from my thesis and also briefly present the conclusions drawn from 
the joint study. 
 
The aim of this study was to assess the effects of fuel tax concessions removal on the 
coastal salmon fishery in the northern Baltic Sea. The idea was to elicit the economic 
and climate benefits from managing the fishery in an optimal way and from 
implementing different fuel cost policies. The current situation of the fishery is thus 
compared to the 
 
i. current situation if fuel cost policies are introduced, 
ii. optimal fishery where tax concessions are maintained, and 
iii. optimal fishery under climate change management. 
 
The results can provide valuable information to policy makers on efficient ways of 
addressing externalities associated with fisheries.   
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The framework of the study at the same time allowed for a comprehensive assessment 
of the commercial salmon fishery in order to relate possible future scenarios with the 
present and past economic and biological conditions. The salmon fishery is currently 
unprofitable, and therefore not fit to bear the burden of additional costs imposed by 
climate change management measures. However, results from the bioeconomic 
analysis suggest that by moving to optimal management, i.e. by adjusting the fishing 
effort to an efficient level, the fishery could be made profitable over the long term. 
Furthermore, an optimally managed fishery would have a positive net present value 
even if fuel cost polices were implemented, and could thus potentially pay for its 
external costs caused by CO2 emissions. However, it seems that economic and climate 
benefits can be reached by simply managing the fishery in an optimal way. This can be 
observed by examining the development of key indicators, such as the fishery’s NPV 
and CO2 emissions when implementing fisheries management and climate change 
management, respectively. 
 
The conclusion of the research project was that optimal fisheries management can be 
an efficient way of mitigating the environmental impact of fossil fuel use in Nordic 
fisheries. Simultaneously, the economic performance of the fisheries is improved. 
Today, many Nordic fisheries are in a state far from optimal management, and some 
even have negative net profits, such as the Baltic salmon fishery. Climate change 
management will further decrease emissions, but to a lesser degree. On the aggregate 
Nordic level, a movement to optimal management would decrease the fishing fleet by 
45%, improve economic performance with 100%, and reduce CO2 emissions with 
nearly 30% (Waldo et al. 2013, 37&39).  
 
The Finnish results differ somewhat from the other case studies when it comes to the 
impact of climate change management. In the case of the EU and Stern scenarios, the 
results are broadly similar to the aggregate results, i.e. that the impact of these policies 
are minor compared to the impact of optimizing the fishery. However, with the 
National scenario there is some discrepancy, since the Finnish fuel tax seems to have a 
bigger impact than in the other cases. There are two reasons for this: first, the Finnish 
case assumes the use of gasoline, which is more expensive and is taxed more heavily 
than diesel, which is used in the other case studies. Because the consumer price of 
gasoline often includes a higher excise duty than diesel (e.g. Martini 2012, 8; Finnish 
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Petroleum Federation 2013), the impact of removing tax concessions will be more 
prominent for gasoline users than for diesel users. Second, because the fishing costs 
are already very high for the Baltic salmon fisheries as it is, even a marginal rise in 
costs may have a significant impact on optimal effort and profitability (see Figure 12). 
 
Although the results suggest that the salmon fishery could be made profitable through 
a movement to optimal management, the present high fishing costs and low fish 
market values will not allow any substantial profits to be gained. For example, 
boycotts of Baltic salmon, initiated by WWF, have resulted in a decline in producer 
prices of salmon (see e.g. Helsingin Sanomat 2012). Additionally, for example rising 
fuel costs (see Appendix B) have had a notable effect on both coastal and offshore 
fishery businesses. Overall, investments in Finnish coastal fisheries have increased, 
but this has not led to increased profits (STECF 2012b, 144). 
 
The results of this study apply to the River Tornionjoki salmon stock, and they are 
therefore only directional with respect to other Baltic salmon fisheries. The River 
Tornionjoki stock counts among the more vital salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea. 
Coastal fisheries are, however, not stock-specific and might therefore pose a threat to 
more weak salmon stocks. According to advice given by ICES (2013a, 1), fishing 
effort in such fisheries should be reduced. This is in line with the policy 
recommendations provided by this study. Additionally, the results indicate that 
compared to the Gulf of Bothnia fishery as a whole, the River Tornionjoki stock 
fishery is economically more sound. This would further support a movement to more 
stock-specific harvesting. However, since this sort of harvesting is possible only in 
rivers and estuaries, this would probably have serious economic and social 
implications for the commercial coastal fisheries. The low profitability of commercial 
salmon fisheries and the high status of recreational fishing in rivers have been the 
cause of continuous debate among different stakeholders in Finland and other Nordic 
countries. 
 
It should be noted that the sensitivity analysis revealed that the results are not 
particularly robust with respect to the investigated parameters. However, how likely 
such changes in these parameters are, is a question that remains unanswered at this 
point. Sufficient to say, fishing costs, which are thoroughly explored throughout this 
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thesis, are in the light of the findings not likely to decrease significantly in the near 
future. It ought to be acknowledged, though, that economic and climate considerations 
do not necessarily go hand in hand. If optimal management implies increasing fishing 
effort, this will lead to greater fuel consumption and CO2 emissions.  
 
Although it is obvious that a small-scale coastal fishery is not the biggest contributor 
to greenhouse gas emissions in the fishing sector, this does not diminish the value of 
the lessons that can be drawn from this study. The assumption here is that the 
hypothetical fuel cost policies are implemented to the whole capture fisheries sector. 
Therefore, it is of interest how this would affect different types of fisheries. Further, 
the results of this thesis and the research project illustrate the potential of fisheries 
management to influence both economic and climate impacts of fisheries. With the 
present high fishing costs for the Baltic salmon fisheries, improving profitability 
means decreasing fishing effort. On the other hand, as the sensitivity analysis revealed, 
a substantial decrease in costs would imply an increase in the optimal amount of effort. 
This indicates that the primary cause of low profitability is high fishing costs and not, 
for example, poor stock status. Again, this is the case for this specific fishery, and 
highlights the importance of fishery- and stock-specific assessments when studying the 
effects of management measures directed at the whole fisheries sector. 
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APPENDIX A. Population dynamics 
 
The model assumes that eggs develop straight into smolts after four years, thus the 
different river stages (alevin, fry, parr) can be left outside the modeling framework. 
The smolts migrate to the Baltic Main Basin, where they feed for a number of years 
(1SW-5SW) before returning to their natal river to spawn. A fixed proportion of the 
stock is assumed to be harvested by the offshore longline fishery in the Main Basin. 
The returning spawners are targeted by the coastal trapnet fishery in the Gulf of 
Bothnia. 
 
Next, I need to know how the salmon stock evolves over time, since it will be the 
constraint in the long-run economic optimization. In the case of an age-classified 
population, the stock is examined with the aid of a population projection matrix. First, 
the state variable, or salmon stock, must be described as a vector. This expresses the 
number of age-specific individuals 
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The different age classes’ survival to the next class is then described by portraying 
age-specific fecundity and probability of survival in a population projection matrix, 
known as a Leslie matrix. Note that fecundity for the five first age-classes is zero, and 
that survival rate for age-classes 1, 2 and 3 is 100%. The Leslie matrix is written as 
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The number of fishable individuals at time t+1 is obtained by multiplying the matrix A 
with the vector N, which portrays the number of individuals at time t 
 
             (A3) 
 
Using matrix notation (A3) can be written as 
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Next, the entries into matrix A are listed hereunder. First, the proportion of eggs 
produced by the spawning stock at time t is given by 
 
  𝑐𝑎,    𝑎  𝑎  𝑎 
   𝐸      (A5) 
 
where E denotes the fishing effort. fe, sr, hr and q are age-specific biological 
parameters. 
 
The eggs will all survive the next three stages, thus 
 
    ,         (A6) 
    ,        (A7) 
    ,        (A8) 
 
The recruitment parameters α and β are used in a Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment 
function that describes the relationship between the number of eggs and the number of 
smolts (Kulmala et al. 2008b, 726). The parameter denoting M74 survival is also an 
important part of the recruitment function, which is here written as follows 
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      (A9) 
 
The proportion of 1SW-5SW salmon surviving to the next age-class is given by the 
following equations 
 
    ,  (     )𝑝     (A10) 
    ,  (     )         (A11) 
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    ,             ,    (A14) 
 
where hr is age-specific homing rate, ps is post-smolt survival, s is adult natural 
survival and oll is offshore longline survival. 
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APPENDIX B. Estimation of trapnet fishing costs 
 
Previously existing and published cost data for the Baltic salmon trapnet fishery is 
scarce (Kulmala et al. 2008a, 16). Therefore, one of my tasks in relation to this study 
was to estimate and update the fishing cost data. Kulmala et al. (2008b) estimated 
fishing costs based on interviews with fishermen participating in the Finnish salmon 
fisheries. Based on questions regarding gear price, gear maintenance as well as fuel 
and labor costs, an average unit cost of fishing was calculated. The cost obtained was 
€24.1/gearday, which thus describes the cost of fishing with one trapnet for one day. 
My estimation is considerably higher, primarily because I assume the use of expensive 
seal safe gear. For example, Holma et al. (2013, 11) have based their costs on Kulmala 
et al. (2008b), but when assuming the use of seal safe gear the obtained cost is 
€43.84/gearday. 
 
The cost I obtained for the current situation and Baseline is €47.55/gearday, i.e. the 
scenario where tax concessions are held in place. I adopted the same cost estimation 
procedure as in Kulmala et al. (2008b). I interviewed nine fishermen per telephone in 
February 2013. The answers and the costs calculated based on the answers are 
gathered in Table B1. However, when calculating the average cost based on the 
answers, I left the costs of two fishermen (nr. 8 and 9) unconsidered. I did this because 
these costs were exceptionally high and outliers compared to the rest of the reported 
costs. The high cost for these two fishers is explained by the low number of fishing 
days and gear. Because the costs are always calculated per gear and per fishing day, 
these two factors will have a significant impact on the cost of fishing. 
 
Table B2 summarizes the results from Table B1, thus showing the fisher-specific cost 
with respect to the current situation and Baseline. Table B3 shows again the average 
scenario-specific costs familiar from chapter 4, but also shows the average individual 
cost items. All cost items apart from fuel cost remain constant in all scenarios. The 
variations in cost are thus caused by the scenario-specific fuel prices (see Table 7).   
 
The variable costs considered are gear price, gear and vessel maintenance, as well as 
fuel and labor costs. Background information includes fishing area, salmon catch per 
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year and the length of the fishing trip. This data has also been inserted into Table B1. 
As mentioned above, the number of fishing days is an important piece of information 
for determining the costs. Salmon fishing with trapnets in the Gulf of Bothnia is 
allowed only during a relatively short period in the summer. Next, there is information 
about the fishing gear, which is also important in determining the total cost. All the 
considered fishermen used seal safe gear, i.e. push up trapnets or modified traditional 
trapnets. The gear price is by far the largest share of the total unit cost. The cost is 
determined by the gear price8, the number of fishing days and the number of years the 
trapnet can be used. The amount of gear is usually restricted to 2-8 trapnets per 
fisherman depending on when the fishing takes place (ICES 2013b, 23). According to 
ICES (2012a, 27) almost all gear presently used in the salmon fishery is seal safe gear. 
 
For the cost of gear and vessel maintenance, I have only considered the amount of 
labor that is taken up by the maintenance work. The fishermen usually do their own 
maintenance and spare parts can even be self-made. Engine service is included in the 
vessel maintenance. In addition to the service of vessel and gear, there is the labor 
taken up by the actual fishing activity. The working day includes the boat trips as well 
as the setting and emptying of the trapnets. The choice of labor cost (€12,5/h) is to 
some extent arbitrary. It is somewhat higher than the cost used by Kulmala et al. 
(2008a), but lower than the €15,5/h found in a report by Tschernij (2007) on the use of 
the pontoon trap9 in coastal fisheries. According to Statistics Finland (2013), in 2011 
the average monthly wage for skilled workers in agriculture and fisheries was €2215. 
This would roughly translate to €13,8/h. The cost used in my estimations is 
somewhere between these wages.  
 
Finally, there is the cost of fuel. I assume here that all fishers use motor gasoline as 
fuel and 98 octane gasoline more specifically. This is a reasonable assumption, since a 
considerable part of the fishing vessels that operate in the coastal fishery are small 
vessels (<10m) using outboard engines that mainly run on gasoline. This was evident 
from my interviews, and can also be observed from Table 2 (p.11), where one can see 
that a considerable part of the fuel consumed by the Finnish fishing fleet is gasoline. 
                                                               
8
 The price for a push up trapnet is around €15 000 (see Table B1). 
9
 The push up trap is also known as pontoon trap. 
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In fisheries, fuel costs often constitute a significant part of the cost of fishing (see e.g. 
OECD 2006, 107), although this proportion will vary depending on the type of fishery, 
such as target fish stock and if passive or active fishing gear is used. Cheilari et al. 
(2013, 20), who assessed the fuel efficiency of a large part of the EU fishing fleet, 
found that for small vessels using passive gear, fuel costs represented 5% of total 
costs. Passive gears are typically less fuel intensive than active gears (e.g. OECD 
2013, 22). In my estimations for the Finnish salmon fleet, the fuel cost stands for 7.6% 
of the total fishing costs in a situation without additional fuel costs. Figure 13 shows 
the development of gasoline price during the last decade. Observe that the depicted 
price is the ordinary consumer price, i.e. no tax concessions are considered. 
Nonetheless, it gives an idea of how the price of fuel has risen over that last ten years.  
 
 
Figure 13. Consumer price of motor gasoline (98 octane) , 2002-2013. 
Source: data from Maskula 2013, personal communication. 
 
In Table B4 are displayed the proportion of the cost items in the different scenarios. In 
the current situation and Baseline, fuel is only the fourth largest cost item (7.6%), after 
gear price, labor and gear maintenance. This same cost structure prevails in the EU 
and Stern scenarios. In the National scenario, however, fuel cost is the third largest 
cost item (13.6%), slightly exceeding the cost of gear maintenance. From these results, 
it is obvious that also the overall labor costs constitute a significant part of the fishing 
costs. 
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Table B1. Calculation table for trapnet day cost in the current situation and Baseline. 
 
Fisher 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
Area Bothnian 
Bay 
Bothnian 
Bay 
Bothnian 
Sea 
Bothnian 
Sea 
Bothnian 
Bay 
Bothnian 
Sea 
Bothnian 
Bay 
Bothnian 
Sea 
Bothnian 
Sea 
Kg catch/year 10000 6000 5000 3000 2000 1000 (*) 2400 500 
Driving distance 
(km/trip) 28 40 29 30 15 44 45 
 
55 37 
          
Fishing days/year 
70 55 60 70 50 50 50 
 
40 
 
45 
          
Trapnet Push-up Salmon Push-up Push-up Whitefish Push-up Salmon Push-up Whitefish 
Quantity 6 5 4 5 2 6 5 4 1 
Working life 
(years) 10 10 10 10 15 10 8 10 15 
Price (€) 14000 15000 15000 15000 10000 15000 10000 15000 13000 
€/trapnet/day 20 27,27 25 21,43 13,33 30 25 37,50 19,26 
          
Gear maintenance 
(h/gear/year) 31 35 48 24 24 24 31 20 80 
€/trapnet/day 5,54 7,95 10 4,29 6 6 7,75 6,25 22,22 
          
Vessel 
maintenance 
(€/year) 250 25 210 218,75 100 350 150 210 1000 
€/day 3,57 0,45 3,50 3,13 2 7 3 5,25 22,22 
          
Fuel consumption 
(liters/year) 1000 3000 1500 600 300 2500 1000 3000 200 
€/trapnet/day 1,66 7,59 4,35 1,19 2,09 5,80 2,78 13,04 3,09 
          
Workday length 
(h) 3 4 3 3 3 4 6 5 4 
€/trapnet/day 6,25 10 9,38 7,50 18,75 8,33 15 15,63 50 
(*) No catch data was provided by the fisher.
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Table B2. Summary of the total fishing costs per fisher in the current situation and Baseline. 
 
Fisher 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 
Gear 20 27,27 25 21,43 13,33 30 25 37,50 19,26 
Gear maintenance 5,54 7,95 10 4,29 6 6 7,75 6,25 22,22 
Vessel 
maintenance 3,57 0,45 3,50 3,13 2 7 3 5,25 22,22 
Fuel 1,66 7,59 4,35 1,19 2,09 5,80 2,78 13,04 3,09 
Labor 6,25 10 9,38 7,50 18,75 8,33 15 15,63 50 
Sum 
€/trapnet day 37,01 53,27 52,22 37,53 42,17 57,13 53,53 77,66 116,80 
  
Table B3. Average scenario-specific cost items and total fishing cost.  
 
Cost item Current situation, Baseline (€) EU (€) Stern (€) National (€) 
Gear 23,15 23,15 23,15 23,15 
Gear maintenance 6,79 6,79 6,79 6,79 
Vessel maintenance 3,24 3,24 3,24 3,24 
Fuel 3,64 3,79 4,38 6,91 
Labor 10,74 10,74 10,74 10,74 
Total 47,55 47,71 48,29 50,83 
 
Table B4. Cost items and their share of total cost in the different scenarios. 
 
Cost item Current situation, Baseline (%) EU (%) Stern (%) National (%) 
Gear 48,7 48,5 47,9 45,5 
Gear maintenance 14,3 14,2 14,1 13,4 
Vessel maintenance 6,8 6,8 6,7 6,4 
Fuel 7,6 8,0 9,1 13,6 
Labor 22,6 22,5 22,2 21,1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 2 
 
 
 
 
